Free Brothers in Arms by Odd Arne Westad

threatened the United States with nuclear retaliation if nuclear weapons were used against China. Khmshchev was particularly enraged that Mao had refused to comply with the notions of nuclear deterrence underlying Soviet messages to Washington. By claiming to be ready to absorb American tactical nuclear strikes without invoking the mutual defense obligations of the Sino-Soviet treaty, Mao had attempted to reduce Soviet influence on Chinese policy during the crisis and in effect poked his nose at the superpower status of the Soviet Union. 76
The main issue for the Soviet leaders after the second Taiwan Straits crisis was not Mao's wish to confront the United States, a desire for which they had a great deal of sympathy, Khrushchev's "peace offensive" notwithstanding. The problem was the conspicuous and irresponsible Chinese behavior toward their Soviet allies during the crisis no consultations on tactics, declining additional Soviet military support, and the bizarre ending to the crisis, in which Mao simply declared the Chinese would stop shelling Jinmen and Mazu on alternate days. Khrushchev, Mikhail Suslov, and other Moscow leaders started questioning Mao's mental stability and instructed Ambassador Iudin to provide more materials on the chairman's private life. 77

     

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Mao's spectacular retreat in the last battle of the Taiwan Straits and the faltering of the Great Leap campaigns made the chairman dampen his diplomatic criticism of the Soviet Union in the spring of 1959. Driven on the defensive internationally and with mounting problems at home, Mao spent much of this time finding reasons for the decline in the fortunes of the revolution. Reading what is available of Mao's writings, it is reasonable to suggest.that toward the summer of 1959 Mao started seeing his problems as directly linked many of his colleagues within the CCP had failed the masses during the Great Leap campaigns because they were wedded to the Soviet path of development. If not checked, these people would destroy the Chinese revolution. From roughly May or June 1959, the Soviet alliance seemed to Mao to be a hindrance and not a support for the development of socialism in China.
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Based on the evidence we have, it is likely that Mao from mid-1959 on was aiming at a dramatic reduction in Sino-Soviet interaction, albeit within the framework of the alliance. Mao's increasing stress on self-reliance Was created out of political necessity Soviet advisors, Chinese studying in the Soviet Union, political and cultural delegations were all potential critics of the CCP's disastrous development policies. As the full effects of the Great Leap Forward became visible in the summer of 1959, Mao started circulating reports critical of Moscow to CCP leaders at all levels. "At the beginning of the construction of the Soviet Union, the speed of industrial development was very high. Later, the speed of industrial development has decreased. Soviet planners constantly lowered the speed of development. [This shows] their right-deviationist thinking," said one report. 79 In the wake of the Lüshan conferences a series of meetings held by the Chinese leaders from early July to mid-August 1959 Mao accused his critics within the party, most notably Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, of conspiring with the Soviets to bring him down. 80
Although the first Sino-Indian border incidents in the summer of 1959 probably were not instigated by China, Mao had no reason to seek a settlement of the conflict. For the Soviets, who had been building a close relationship with India during Khrushchev's time in power, both the timing and the character of the flare-ups indicated Chinese premeditation: The incidents came on the eve of Khruishchev's visit to the United States and were directed against India, a country that symbolized Soviet abilities to have a diplomatic impact outside the socialist world. Khrushchev was able to hold his temper on the American tour, although he had indicated