Free The South China Sea by Bill Hayton Page B

‘grassroots’ solidarity activities and, as nationalist sentiments have swelled in recent years, participation in fund-raising campaigns for the soldiers and sailors out at sea has become ever greater. The sums involved are relatively small, easily within the gift of central government, but the mobilisational power of the campaigns cannot be measured in monetary value alone. They are powerful tools with which the leadership wins popular support. Newspapers have publicly committed themselves to ‘propagandise’ information about the islands and provinces organise gift-giving events at which coral branches and beach pebbles are exchanged for donations of karaoke DVDs, table tennis tables, electrical generators and cartons of cigarettes. TV programmes feature reporters in patriotic T-shirts extolling the courageous men and women who defend the faraway national territory. A decade ago these would have been dull rituals but now they are enthusiastically followed by an appreciative audience.
    Vietnam did not enjoy ‘first mover advantage’ in its choice of positions in the Spratlys. The Republic of China reoccupied Itu Aba, the largest island, in 1956. The Philippines occupied Thitu (Pagasa in Filipino), Nanshan (Lawak) and Flat (Patag) Islands, and North Danger Reef, sometime before July 1971. (They considered landing on Itu Aba too but were deterred by Taiwanese ships.) By the time the South Vietnamese sent in the marines in September 1973, choices were becoming more limited. Spratly Island – Truong Sa Lon – was an obvious candidate as it was the closest proper island to the Vietnamese mainland and also outside the area claimed by the Philippines. They learnt from the Filipinos’ mistake and didn't try to occupy Itu Aba: it had been heavily reinforced by this time. Instead they surreptitiously moved onto Namyit Island, another part of the same atoll – the Tizard Bank – about 20 kilometres across the lagoon. 8 Around the same time they also took over Sin Cowe Island (Dao Sinh Ton) on Union Bank (the seventh largest island) and, much further to the south, Amboyna Cay (Dao An Bang).
    Another prize fell to the Vietnamese through a combination of alcohol and bad weather. The two northernmost islands of the Spratlys lie on what the British had named North Danger Reef. This was where, in October 1956, Filemon Cloma had been forced by the Taiwanese Navy to abandon his island-grabbing antics. As its French name – Les Deux Iles – suggests, the reef has two main features: the 2-kilometre-long Northeast Cay (Parola in Filipino) and the 650-metre-long Southwest Cay (Pugad in Filipino). In early 1975 Filipino garrisons occupied both and the two units would often socialise together. One night the officers and men from Pugad were invited to Parola for a party. According to General Juancho Sabban, former head of the Philippine Western Command, they were unable to return to Pugad because of severe weather. Unfortunately for the Filipinos, the weather wasn't severe enough to prevent South Vietnamese troops sneaking onto the island in their absence. 9 Pugad has been occupied by the Vietnamese ever since and is now known to its inhabitants as Dao Song Tu Tay.
    That wasn't the end of the story, as we saw in Chapter 3. Only a few months later, in the closing weeks of the Vietnam War, Hanoi launched its ‘East Sea Campaign’ to grab all the islands that were under South Vietnamese control. Southwest Cay was their first target. Special forces landed on 13 April. After a short firefight some of the defenders realisedtheir position was hopeless and surrendered. But one lieutenant, facing the prospect of a Communist prison camp, put his faith in capitalist camaraderie. He threw himself upon the good offices of the same Filipino soldiers his unit had so recently humiliated and swam the 3 kilometres across the lagoon to the safety of Parola. Luckily for him, the Filipinos were forgiving and gave him sanctuary. Meanwhile, the Communists