Free The South China Sea by Bill Hayton

of Chinese sovereignty claims over the Paracel Islands.
    In particular, the southern administration placed the islands under the nominal administration of Hainan Island in 1921 and then granted permits for the extraction of guano. In 1923 and 1927 they sent patrols to inspect the activities of the guano collectors. (The historian Ulises Granados has found evidence in contemporary reports by British intelligence that these permits were actually agreed with a front company for Japanese interests which reportedly promised to provide weapons and funding in exchange for development rights over Hainan Island and the Paracels. 3 ) The French authorities (on behalf of the protectorate of Annam) failed to protest against all this and this inaction is now used as evidence of French acquiescence to Chinese sovereignty. But how should a modern tribunal regard actions taken by a government that had no recognition from the ‘great powers’ before 1928?
    The situation becomes more complex after the establishment of the (Communist) People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949 and the expulsion of the Republic of China to Taiwan. Beijing clearly doesn't recognise the legitimacy of the Republic of China in Taiwan but the Communist state's rights in the Spratly Islands rest entirely on the claim to Itu Aba, first made by forces of the Republic of China in 1946. The Communist authorities in Beijing now champion the voyage of the Taiping as a claim of sovereignty made on behalf of all China. They took a different view of the ship 60 years ago, during the first Taiwan Strait crisis, seeing it as a symbol of American imperialism. Communist forces sank the Taiping offthe Tachen Islands on 14 November 1954. The incident highlights the problems the Beijing leadership might have constructing a legal case for its sovereignty over the Spratlys. If it is the successor state to the Republic of China, can it claim that actions taken by the Republic of China after the declaration of the Communist state on 1 October 1949 reinforce its own claim? For example, in 1956 it was the navy of the Republic of China that evicted the Cloma brothers’ expedition from Itu Aba and North Danger Reef. That would appear to be a concrete assertion of sovereignty by the Republic of China – but is it one that can be appropriated by the People's Republic of China? If the Taiwan government ever chose to merge with the People's Republic of China on the mainland this is one point over which it would have considerable leverage.
    None of these issues has been tested in an international court and, given the complexity and uncertainty of the intersecting legal difficulties, it seems unlikely that they ever will. All we can say is that, from historical perspective, none of the claims to the islands – whether by Britain, France, the Republic of China, the People's Republic of China, Vietnam or, as we shall see later, the Philippines – appears to be entirely convincing. If Britain had kept its flag flying on Spratly Island and France had done the same on Itu Aba or if either had formally ceded its rights to another claimant, the situation might be clearer. But they haven't, so the countries around the shores of the sea have, instead, created their own facts in the ‘dangerous ground’.
    * * * * * *
    These days Richard Spratly's ‘sandy isle’ is known to its inhabitants as Truong Sa Lon – big Truong Sa. ‘Big’ is relative. It is the largest piece of dry land in the Spratlys under Vietnamese control – but that's not saying much. Its highest natural point is two and a half metres above sea level although there's very little that's natural about Spratly Island now. The beach has been enclosed behind a high concrete wall intended to keep out both waves and unwanted visitors. Over the wall protrude dozens of posts and pylons: solar-powered floodlights, electricity-generating windmills, radar towers and a huge mobile phone mast. Urban roofs mingle surreally with the