Free Find, Fix, Finish by Aki Peritz, Eric Rosenbach

PREFACE
     
    T errorism is a political tornado that has the capacity to wreck lives and disrupt societies. For those unlucky bystanders caught up in its path and for those who have lost loved ones in attacks, terrorism is a random, unforgivably cruel turn of fate. The specter of terrorism causes people to think twice about normal social activities: joining a crowd, idling at a café, boarding a plane, and taking the subway. Terrorists fray the intangible ties that bind, causing otherwise rational individuals and modern civilizations to act in irrational, medieval ways.
    Al-Qaeda has been the world’s foremost purveyor of this particularly lethal form of social mayhem. Its 9/11 operation was notable not only for its destructive capacity but also for its audacity, striking the heart of the world’s superpower on a sunny Tuesday morning. And, unlike many terror groups that have focused on regional and parochial interests, al-Qaeda has taken its cause worldwide. Al-Qaeda members have attacked New York City, Madrid, London, Amman, Istanbul, Islamabad . . . the list goes on and on.
    For all the rhetoric that followed 9/11, America did not possess a fully formed, off-the-shelf strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda. Rather, on September 12, the US began the first of a series of painful, halting steps to confront this determined adversary. America’s counterterrorism policy is a dense web of interconnected stories of men and women making tough choices and authorizing risky decisions. It is a complex series of tales filled with victories as well as defeats, resolute behavior, bureaucratic compromises, paths taken and those not.
    As we enter the spring of 2012, America’s leaders insist that al-Qaeda is on the ropes. Upbeat evaluations have been the hallmarks of American policymakers even in the worst of times. “I’m convinced,” defense secretary Leon Panetta said in mid-2011, “that we’re within reach of strategically defeating al-Qaeda.” Michael Vickers, who a generation ago provided creative solutions in the covert war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, expanded this sentiment, noting that “within 18 to 24 months core al-Qaeda cohesion and operational capabilities could be degraded to the point that the group could fragment and exist mostly as a propaganda arm.” Thankfully, this optimism may be merited. While al-Qaeda has proven itself a resilient and resourceful foe, America’s ability to track and destroy al-Qaeda operatives anywhere on earth has never been better.
     
     
    BOTH AUTHORS served in sensitive US government positions. As such, various publication review boards have examined this manuscript. Some redactions remain as blacked-out text in the final version of this book. Uncle Sam also asked to include the following text: In the interest of full disclosure, this publication was submitted for pre-publication reviews to the Central Intelligence Agency to ensure that no classified information was accidentally disclosed. However, the CIA’s review did not shape the case study’s scope, tone, or subject material; rather, the authors remain solely responsible for this publication’s content.

THE COLOSSUS SHIFTS ITS FOOTING
     
    For much of American history, when the US looked to take on foreign threats it focused on the menace of hostile nation-states. With rare exceptions—such as when Thomas Jefferson sent US naval forces to battle the Barbary pirates in the early nineteenth century, or when Woodrow Wilson authorized the US Army to (unsuccessfully) hunt for Pancho Villa in Mexico in the early twentieth century—the US has understood the primary threat to its security interests as coming from national adversaries.
    No longer. The 9/11 attacks brutally exposed an inability to detect and disrupt a small, highly disciplined, well-trained group of individuals bent on massive destruction. Understandably, America’s efforts in the decade since have been refocused on targeting people and small