Free 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War by Benny Morris

"cantons," Jews and Arabs were offered a measure of local autonomy (responsibility for municipal affairs, agriculture, education, and so on). The plan also provided for the immediate transfer to Palestine of one hundred thousand DPs and eventual independence for Palestine as a unitary (or binational) state. In September, the British convened a conference in London, attended by British officials and representatives of the Arab states, to discuss the plan. But nothing came of it. The Zionists, who did not attend, insisted on "Jewish statehood," and the Arabs demanded "immediate Arab independence." The American response was equally unequivocal: on 4 October 1946, Truman formally rejected Morrison-Grady, hesitantly endorsed partition and Jewish statehood (a solution, he said, that "would command the support of public opinion in the United States"),," and called for an immediate start to "substantial" immigration. Truman's statement was in large measure prompted by the upcoming midterm American elections. Attlee was bowled over: he complained that Truman "did not wait to acquaint [himself] with the reasons" for the plan.82 Meanwhile, the Haganah pressed on with its illegal immigration campaign.
    On z7 January 1947, the British took one last shot at resolving the crisis. They reconvened the London conference, this time with the AHC represented. But the Zionists continued to boycott the talks, and the United States declined to send an observer. The Arabs continued to refitse anything short of complete, immediate independence, and the Jews, anything less than Jewish statehood in all or part of Palestine.
    With no acceptable military solution to the Jewish guerrilla-terrorist and illegal immigration campaigns, and with no political solution to the ZionistArab impasse, Britain had reached the end of the road.
     

    On i4 February 1947, the British cabinet decided to wash its hands of Palestine and dump the problem in the lap of the United Nations. Ernest Bevin was later to say: "The Arabs, like the Jews, [had] refused to accept any of the compromise proposals which HMG had put before both parties."i The military chiefs of staffwere unhappy with the decision; it would open the door to Soviet penetration and subvert the morale of the troops in Palestine. But Clement Attlee and Bevin had already decided, in principle, in a tete-atete on 27 December 1946, that in the new, postwar circumstances, Britain could give up Palestine and Egypt (as well as Greece),' and the cabinet stood firm: Britain had made what it saw as a series of reasonable offers and no one was interested. And the United States, far from expressing a willingness to shoulder or share responsibility, was continuously subverting Britain's efforts.
    "We have decided that we are unable to accept the scheme put forward either by the Arabs or by the Jews, or to impose ourselves a solution of our own.... The only course now open to us is to submit the problem to the judgment of the United Nations," Bevin told the House of Commons on 18 February 1947, adding that Britain would not recommend to the United Nations "any particular solution."3 The international community would have to take up the burden and chart a settlement. During the London conference, the Arabs had not been averse to the problem going before the United Nations, where they anticipated a favorable outcome. Conversely, the Zionist delegates had been wary. This may have affected Bevin's decision.
    Historians have since argued about Britain's reasons. Some have suggested that Bevin and the cabinet had not been entirely straightforward: by threatening the two sides with the prospect of the unknown and the unpredictable, Britain's intention had been to force the Jews and/or the Arabs to accept the latest set of Whitehall proposals or to agree to a continuation of the Mandate. Certainly David Ben-Gurion, then and later, believed that the move was a ploy designed to prolong British rule: Bevin would hand the United Nations