Free International Security: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) by Christopher S. Browning

since 2003, claims that the technological edge would lead to faster and cleaner engagements ring hollow. While its technological edge enabled the limited forces of the US-led Coalition of the Willing to undertake an unparalleled advance on Baghdad in 2003 and to bring about an initial defeat of Iraqi forces, as in Afghanistan their ability to win the subsequent ‘peace’ was less obvious. The point is that in response to its unprecedented military superiority the enemies of America and its allies have adopted alternative tactics designed to nullify some of the West’s advantages. Instead of risking annihilation on a designated battlefield they are increasingly adopting the tactics of guerrilla warfare, launching lightning strikes, deploying improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and targeting perceived Western vulnerabilities and sensibilities that might undermine the legitimacy and commitment to particular campaigns—for example, through deliberately killing civilians.
    Second, critics argue that the emphasis on air power and cruise missiles is indicative of the West’s desire to transfer as much of the risks of war onto the enemy as possible. At one level this appears prudent and responds to the perceived sensitivity of Western publics to the taking of casualties. However, it also signals a very different image of war. Instead of war as a process of thrust and counter-thrust and a reciprocity of risk between participants, Western engagements can sometimes appear as a very unbalanced slaughter of one side by the other.
    The benefits of such risk transfer, however, are not always as obvious as they seem. A good example is provided by NATO’s eleven-week bombing campaign conducted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, in response to the Serbian-dominated government’s aggressive actions of ethnic cleansing of Kosovan Albanians in Kosovo. While NATO undertook thousands of sorties and dropped around 20,000 ‘smart bombs’ on Yugoslav targets, the effect was limited. Indeed,ethnic cleansing of Kosovan Albanians increased during the bombing campaign. Frustrated, NATO resorted to bombing a wider range of targets. While initially the focus had been on targeting military installations, hardware, and units, faced by continued Serbian intransigence this was expanded to targets in Serbia with both a military and civilian function, such as power stations, water processing plants, bridges, factories, and telecommunications and broadcasting facilities. For its critics, NATO’s actions increasingly looked like an exercise in collective punishment against the whole of the Serbian population, with NATO’s bombing campaign causing around 500 civilian deaths and 6,000 casualties. Moreover, instead of helping the plight of Kosovan Albanians the operation may have exacerbated the humanitarian crisis. However, throughout the campaign the option of a ground invasion was rejected because of the potential risk of allied casualties. To this extent, the emphasis on minimizing Western casualties (of which there were none) may have been counter-productive to the operation’s goals, while it also sent out the message that Western lives were to be prioritized over those of others. Given that the Kosovo operation was sold to the public as a humanitarian necessity this easily raised questions of humanitarian double standards.
    Finally, there is also a concern that the RMA, and the development of precision-guided munitions in particular, is encouraging Western governments to take a more positive view of war’s utility as an instrument of policy. Insofar as it is believed war can be quick and clean, targeted specifically at the ‘bad guys’, while minimizing the number of civilian casualties, then there is a possibility that it becomes viewed as an increasingly acceptable policy option. Critics therefore worry that the RMA and the emphasis on precision strikes is sanitizing the reality of war for Western publics. Moreover, if war