Free Unthinkable by Kenneth M. Pollack Page B

we must.
    It should also be self-evident why there remains a broad consensus that the United States should try to make a revised carrot-and-stick policy work. It is unquestionably the best of our bad choices. The Obama administration is right to pursue it, and to pursue it for as long as it offers any prospect of hope. There are three related aspects of the administration’s approach that are particularly important to consider moving forward.
    The administration is correct to focus on weaponization as the key red line for Iran’s nuclear program—the step that we have to try to prevent if we can—and not the achievement of a narrow breakout capability.Iran already has a breakout capability. Moreover, any deal secured by the carrot-and-stick approach will leave Iran with some kind of a breakout capability, and it is hard to affix a specific time span to what a certain set of capabilities would translate into in terms of a breakout window. The difference between even a narrow breakout window of just a month or two and Iran’s possession of a deployed nuclear arsenal is huge. In short, the administration is correct to not let perfect become the enemy of good enough, because if we demand perfection, we will probably get nothing at all.
    Building off the previous point, the administration is right that there is no reason to impose false time constraints on the negotiations. The real deal-breaker would be Iranian weaponization. Short of that, there is no reason not to keep negotiating, and to keep pushing Iran to make compromises by dint of sanctions and other forms of pressure. This does not mean that we should hold off on imposing these forms of pressure on Iran indefinitely. There is no reason we cannot tell the Iranians that they have until a specific date to accept the terms of an offer or they will be subject to additional penalties. Just that the real decision point for the United States is when we see Iran moving to weaponize, and we should not create false, artificial deadlines based on the fear that Iran is about to pass some other milestone related to a breakout window rather than to weaponization.
    The Israelis have tried to create such artificial deadlines as a way of holding the world’s feet to the fire. Jerusalem’s rationale is entirely understandable, it has worked so far, and it was probably necessary for them to do so. But we should note that at least a half dozen such Israeli red lines have passed by without an Israeli attack, and therefore we should not short-circuit the process and give up what would be the best feasible outcome because of a false deadline created principally to galvanize international action. Israel’s ability to cause meaningful damage to the Iranian nuclear program has now diminished to the point where it should not be a driving consideration in our approach to Iran. Again, the administration has been right to maintain that if anyone were going to bomb Iran, itshould be the United States, and we have a lot more time than the Israelis do. Because of our much greater capabilities, we have until Iran begins to weaponize. We do not need to act before then, if we choose to act in this fashion at all.
    For my part, I will also say that I fully agree with the administration’s focus on securing a deal with Iran that would cap its nuclear progress short of weaponization and enable extensive, intrusive inspections to ensure that Tehran complies—and ensure that we would know it if they don’t. I do not believe that it is necessary to roll back Iran’s nuclear progress to eliminate any breakout capability, nor do I believe that such a standard is possible any longer. The Iranians have made it clear that they will not agree to a deal that does not allow them some enrichment capability; therefore we should focus on getting a deal that gives us the greatest confidence that Iran would not weaponize rather than trying to make it physically impossible for