Free The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order by Sean McFate

need not spill much of its own blood, thereby giving the appearance of humanizing warfare and even making war seem virtuous when labeled “humanitarian intervention,” as was the case in the Balkans. Such anodyne endeavors to humanize war are delusional, as Carl von Clausewitz, the great eighteenth-century Prussian war theorist, cautions: “Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst.” 9 Nonetheless, private armies became an attractive option for the United States well before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Utility of Private Force
    The appeal of private force is understandable regardless of century. Even Sir Thomas More, the Renaissance humanist and author of
Utopia
, coining the word, advocated using mercenaries. Despite the protestations of Catherine of Siena in the Middle Ages or organizations such as Human Rights First today, private armies are big business for a reason: they work. As with many things in the world, the utility of private force varies from individual situation to individual situation. But for many, the military advantages that mercenaries provideto employers are significant and timeless, which is why they remain an enduring facet of history.
    First, mercenaries offer on-demand military services to execute whatever plans their employers please, whether buttressing national security, furthering a commercial interest, settling a dispute, self-glorification, or self-preservation. In an insecure world, there will always be a demand for security services. The
condottieri
made their livelihoods surfing the maelstrom of armed politics that pervaded northern Italy during the high Middle Ages, so much so that some mercenary captains became political actors in their own right, such as Braccio da Montone and Sigismondo Malatesta, who ruled lands in addition to private armies. Others, such as Francesco Sforza of Milan, became so strong that they took over the states they served, as warlord became lord.
    On-demand soldiers also allow rulers to swell their armies’ ranks with mercenaries when volunteers or conscripts are lacking. Examples are numerous: Persia in the fifth century BC; William the Conqueror in the eleventh century; Sweden and the Holy Roman Empire in the seventeenth century; England, France, and Prussia in the eighteenth century; and the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan today. In each of these cases, for-hire soldiers made up one-third to one-half of the overall military strength. On-demand force also allows a surge capacity to serve the immediate strategic needs of rulers who fail to plan. When England found that it did not possess enough ground troops to suppress its rebellious colonies during the American Revolution (1776–1781), England doubled its army by hiring thirty thousand German soldiers. Two hundred years later, the United States is in a similar position to its former foe: half of its military force structure is made up of contractors, and the United States cannot fight without them.
    Second, private armies can be cheaper than public ones, as maintaining a year-round professional standing army is expensive regardless of era. The tax revenue required to field, maintain, and manage such a force is sizable, involving capital costs such as barracks and siege engines and sustaining costs such as salaries and upkeep. Removing citizens from economically productive jobs such as farming or factories to stand in the ranks of an army is a significant opportunity cost to the country’s economy, as the military does not produce a commodity that can be sold for profit and taxed. Many economists view military expenditure as essentially inflationary. Finally, governments tend not to be as