Free Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy by Simon Blackburn Page A

mental add-on. These thinkers are in fact stuck with the same problem of interaction that
faces Locke. We discuss it more in the next chapter.

    But there are other thinkers who think that a rational relationship can be made out. I shall introduce two broad approaches. The
first tries to give an `analysis' of the mental, in terms that enable us
to see it as a Leihnizian expression of the physical.The second tries
for a scientific kind of reduction or identity of the mental to the
physical.
    ANALYSIS
    Analysis, as philosophers aim at it, attempts to say what makes true
some mysterious kinds of statement, using terms from some less
mysterious class. Analysis is easily illustrated by a homely example.
Suppose someone becomes perplexed by that icon of modern
Western life, the average man, with his 2.4 children and 1.8 automobiles. How can this joke figure he of any real interest? The answer is given by showing what makes true statements couched in
terms of him: here that, across families, the total number of children divided by number of progenitors is 2.4, and automobiles
divided by number of owners is 1.8. This information is succinctly
presented in terms of the average man. He is what Russell called a
`logical construction' out of aggregates of facts. (This does not mean
that all statements about the average are sensible or useful: as has
been said, the average person has one testicle and one breast.)
Philosophers also talk of a reduction of statements of one kind to
those of another. Analyses provide the reductions.

    Analysis tells us what is meant by statements made in one form
of words, in terms of statements made in other words. Its credentials as an intellectual tool have themselves been the topic of a great
deal of philosophical controversy, and its status has varied over the
last hundred years. Some, such as Russell and G. E. Moore (1873-
1958), thought of it as the essential goal of philosophy. Later, its
prospects were queried by the leading American thinker of the
mid-twentieth century, W. V. Quine (1908- ), and by others, and
their pessimism was given some credibility by the depressing fact
that very few philosophical analyses seemed successful. Currently
analysis is enjoying something of a cautious revival. But for our
purposes these methodological questions can he set aside. The
point is that if we can analyse mental ascriptions in physical terms,
then the Leibnizian dream of a rational or a priori way of seeing
how the physical gives rise to the mental is vindicated.
    l.et us take pain as an example of a mental state. Suppose now we
try to analyse what it is for someone to he in pain. We identify pain
primarily in terms of what pain makes us do (which is also what it
is for, in evolutionary terms). Pain makes us do a variety of things.
It demands attention, it causes us to immobilize parts of the body,
distracts us from other things, and of course it is unpleasant. Suppose we can sum these consequences in terms of tendencies or dispositions to behaviour. Then the suggestion is that to be in pain
just is to be disposed in these ways. This is the analysis of what it
means, or what makes it true, that a person is in pain. This result
would bean a priori exercise of reason, brought about by thinking
through what is really intended by statements about this kind of
mental event. Then the mystery of consciousness disappears. You and your twin, since you share dispositions (you verifiably tend to
behave the same way), share your sensations, because this is what
sensations are.

    This doctrine is called logical behaviourism. I believe there is
something right about it, but there are certainly difficulties. We
might object that we are familiar with the idea that people can
share the same sensation although they react somewhat differently. One can stub one's toe one day, and make a fearful fuss about
it, but do the same thing, and feel the same pain, another day and
bravely