Free The Price of Politics by Bob Woodward Page B

“does many things right,” he wrote. “But it does almost nothing to reform medical malpractice laws.” The president himself, Orszag said, had urged, at the American Medical Association in June 2009, that there should be “broader use of evidence-based guidelines” for doctors treating a specific illness or condition. Orszag proposed that any doctor who could demonstrate he had followed these guidelines should not be held liable for malpractice.
    Orszag later described the plan to others as a sort of Nixon-goes-to-China moment. By proposing its own version of malpractice reform, the Democratic administration could blunt one of the Republicans’ most common attacks: the claim that Democrats were in the pocket of the trial lawyers, who benefited immensely from medical malpractice cases.
    Should he alert the White House? he wondered. Better not to surprise them. With some discomfort, because a columnist is supposed to speak for himself, not his former employer, Orszag sent his draft to Valerie Jarrett. It was about three days before the column was scheduled to run. Here’s a draft, he wrote in an email to her. Let me know if you have any comments.
    Thanks, Jarrett wrote back. She offered no comments on the draft.
    The column ran as scheduled, unchanged from the draft Orszag had provided the White House.
    Orszag was in an airport when he got Jarrett’s email. How could you have done this? It’s ridiculous. You’re so disloyal.
    You have got to realize the health care bill is wildly unpopular, Orszag replied. Every single speech I give, if I lead with this reflection on its imperfections, the dynamic changes. People will then listen. You can’t hold this law out as perfect. It won’t sell. People think it’s a piece of crap. The weaknesses must be acknowledged. Then it’s credible to say, here’s why it is good and why it is the only thing that will work.
    Jarrett’s answer was delivered with Politburo finality: You have burned your bridges.

7

    O n election night, November 2, 2010, the Republicans seized control of the House, winning an astonishing 63 seats—the largest swing in 62 years. 38
    Protocol dictated that the president make a congratulatory call to Boehner, the presumptive incoming speaker of the House. The trouble was, nobody in the White House had thought to get a phone number.
    Staff began to scramble. Who would know how to reach Boehner?
    Finally, someone remembered that Brad Woodhouse, communications director for the Democratic National Committee, was a fishing buddy of somebody who worked for Boehner.
    Someone called Woodhouse. Could he help?
    Woodhouse called his friend Nick Schaper, new media director for Boehner, and relayed a number back to the White House.
    At midnight, the phone rang in the Grand Hyatt in Washington, where Boehner and his staff were celebrating.
    Congratulations, John, the president said.
    Thank you, he replied. Mr. President, he added, I’ve always been straightforward and honest with you in the past and that’s the way I’ll be with you in the future. I’m looking forward to working together to create jobs and cut spending.
    The conversation lasted only a few moments.
    Thanks for the call, the speaker said.
    • • •
    The president had to reassess.
    In the next Congress, the Republicans would have a majority of 242–193. But it wasn’t just control of the House that had changed. The election had altered the character of the Republican Party in Congress. Dozens of incoming freshman Republicans identified closely with the anti-tax, anti-government-spending Tea Party movement, shifting an already conservative Republican conference further to the right.
    In the days immediately following the election, White House staff saw a different president from the man they had worked with the past two years.
    Obama had kept his cool through the auto industry bailout and the struggle to pass the Affordable Care Act. But in the immediate aftermath of the election, he chaired