Free The Price of Politics by Bob Woodward

“Don’t get yourself crazy. Economics is not politics.”
    The phone call then ended abruptly.
    Reports quickly circulated among CEOs that Emanuel had hung up on Palmisano. But the IBM chief later said that he thought Emanuel just had to leave the call in a hurry.
    Palmisano, nonetheless, believed the Obama White House had a bigger problem. Obama had no chief operating officer, no COO to implement his decisions. He had people like Emanuel whose primary focus was Congress. And Obama had Valerie Jarrett and David Axelrod but they were advisers, and in Palmisano’s view “political hacks” and “B or C players” who did not know how to get serious about fixing problems and following through. There was no implementer. Thus the country was adrift and was not serious about its most fixable problem—becoming and staying competitive.
    Whatever the analysis, however, it was clear the Obama business outreach program needed work.
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    On December 8, 2010, Ivan Seidenberg released another Business Roundtable manifesto called “Roadmap for Growth.” 32 It covered “thedeep recession and weak economic recovery,” high unemployment, the federal deficit and “unprecedented” debt.
    Seidenberg said publicly, “I think the president has shown a willingness to learn.” 33
    Jarrett immediately phoned Greg Brown of Motorola.
    “The president is learning?” she asked. “Is Ivan the teacher and he’s the student? This is offensive.”
    She emailed Seidenberg directly just one word: “Learning?” Then she called him and expanded on her outrage.
    Valerie, Seidenberg wrote back, that was an extreme compliment. Wasn’t everyone, the president and the CEOs, always supposed to be learning?
    Unappeased, Jarrett continued contacting other members of the Business Roundtable to say that Seidenberg had insulted the president of the United States.
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    The bottom line for Obama, as best Seidenberg could tell, was that the president did not trust that anything he did with the business leaders would ever work out for him. If he cut a deal with business, he was going to look bad. Business’s interests were not his. And whenever Obama was cornered, out would tumble the “fat cat” language.
    Seidenberg felt that the president just didn’t think it was important to address the complaints of the business leaders. That was a mistake, he told Jarrett. He had been the CEO of Verizon throughout the entire Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies.
    “With all due respect,” he said, “we will be here when you’re gone. I’m a perfect example of that. So you have to realize that this very progressive agenda, and this once-in-a-lifetime moment for this man in this world can be lost because guys like me can hunker down and wait you out.”
    So, the theory of the business case shifted. If Obama was going to be a pain in the ass, Seidenberg calculated that maybe they should turn to the GOP. “The best way to check them is McConnell and Boehner.”
    Word of this soon reached the House minority leader, and it was not long before Ivan Seidenberg’s phone rang.
    “I’d like you to do a fundraiser for me,” Boehner said.
    Seidenberg said he’d be delighted.
    Two weeks later, at an event in New York City, the business community raised $1.5 million for Obama’s main Republican opposition. It was only the beginning.
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    After 16 months on the job as OMB director, Peter Orszag wanted out. Obama and the other senior staff—Emanuel in particular—agreed it was time for him to go. Emanuel thought Orszag was leaking to the media and said he had too cozy a relationship with congressional Democrats.
    Orszag delivered his final speech as a cabinet member at the Brookings Institution on July 28, 2010. 34 Responding to a question, he affirmed that it was the administration’s policy to push for extension of the Bush administration’s tax cuts for middle-and lower-income taxpayers, but to allow the cuts for the wealthy