Free Master Chief by Alan Maki Page A

mainly a matter of power—true power was held by the administrators. They controlled the agendas but never had to operate!
    At Dai Uy’s meeting at Binh Thuy, he learned that the commodore only wanted to discuss the SEAL platoon messages called UNODIR—unless otherwise directed. Lieutenant Fletcher explained to Lieutenant B. and the commodore the procedures for sending UNODIR messages during SEAL platoon operations. It was disgusting that November Platoon’s op had been halted for such a frivolous meeting.
    July eleventh, on the other hand, was a fruitful day forNovember Platoon. Waneous, our expert vehicle thief, managed to steal a good 2½-ton Army truck at Tan Son Nhut Air Base by hot-wiring the switch. From that point on, we didn’t have any problems hauling Chief Bassett’s cumshaw gear from Saigon to Dong Tam. Chief Bassett managed to get sheets of plywood, wiring, refrigerated air conditioners, refrigerators, steaks, and booze, among other things.
    Later that day, we gave our old jeep to our three Vietnamese Kit Carson scouts and two interpreters. The five of them were tickled to death and promptly headed to My Tho on liberty with their prized possession. After their glorious entry into town, the jeep’s rear end suddenly went out. The only way they could get the temperamental beast to move was to engage the front axle by placing it in four-wheel drive. Much to our amusement, the jeep would only move in reverse and at a very slow pace. Our scouts had a long, humbling ride back to Dong Tam.
    On the morning of July twelfth, November Platoon was preparing for another operation with Navy Seawolves, Sea Lord slicks, and Black Pony OV-10s that afternoon. We had good, hard operational intelligence information from the Cai Lay district PSB subsection chief Muoi—not the Provincial National Police chief Muoi in My Tho—that a VC District Military Proselytizing Section chief’s home was located in the village of Tan Hoi approximately four klicks north of highway QL-4. There were reports that units of the VC 269B Main Force Infantry Battalion were also located in the nearby tree line. Chief Muoi and another of his operatives were to be our guides.
    Dai Uy had given all hands the warning order that morning, followed by his PLO at 1600, inspection at 1630, and rehearsal until 1745. The basic idea was that the slicks would swoop in side by side at treetop level,flare the two helo slicks near the hootches, and hover six feet from the ground. Each SEAL squad was to exit the helos, Dai Uy’s 1st Squad taking right flank and ENS Kleehammer’s 2nd Squad taking the left flank. One fire team from each squad was to set up skirmish lines while the other two Are teams assaulted the hootches immediately after insertion—John Wayne style. The Seawolves and Black Ponies would take care of the enemy fire from the tree line.
    At approximately 1830 our slicks popped up over the tree line and hovered near the targeted hootches long enough for both squads to jump from the helos. Our setup and assault went as planned. The nearest huts were quickly searched, with negative results.
    Shortly afterward, Lieutenant Fletcher was notified by the helo pilots that they had inadvertently inserted us in the wrong location. Dai Uy immediately had us extracted and inserted near our targets, but there wasn’t a man in the area—only women and children. We had begun to learn that the VC/NVA had a variety of ingenious escape routes and techniques to evade surprise helo ground-troop assaults. In spite of our best efforts, we were forced to extract empty-handed and return to Dong Tam for the debriefing.
    Our primary problem was that we needed timely guidance and direction from above. For tactical reasons, our Sea Lord slicks were forced to skim the treetops at a good rate of speed to ensure surprise. This SOP was based on several requirements: low visibility, especially when there were several helos; reduction of the Huey rotor’s unique