Free Winston Churchill's War Leadership by Sir Martin Gilbert Page A

of purpose at the centre of the diplomatic web, and sent him instead to be Ambassador to Washington and appointed Anthony Eden in his place. Eden was one of those closest to Churchill. It was to Eden that Churchill confided, in December 1940, about the period six months earlier as France fell and Britain awaited invasion: “Normally I wake up buoyant to face the new day. Then I woke up with dread in my heart.” On the day the war in Europe ended, Eden wrote to Churchill: “It is you who have led, uplifted and inspired us through the worst days. Without you this day could not have been.”
    Those “worst days” had lasted a long time, and put a heavy strain on all those involved in the conduct of the war. Churchill found the physical and mental resources to bear that strain, despite several severe illnesses. He could not replace himself, and followed the advice he gave to one of his secretaries, basing himself on a First World War example: “We must keep working, like the gun horses, till we drop.”
    Two of the most difficult wartime decisions Churchill had to make in regard to appointments were the removal, first, of General Sir Archibald Wavell and then of General Sir Claude Auchinleck from command in North Africa. In both cases Churchill felt that the initial drive of the commander had faded and that a more energetic commander was needed. As General Ismay recalled after the war, “I think there was a very general impression in Whitehall that Wavell was very tired.” After Wavell had been defeated by Rommel, Eden noted, he “had aged ten years in the night.” As for Auchinleck, the general himself was anxious to lay down his active command after his sustained exertions, a course of action approved by General Brooke. Those not in possession of the facts and the recommendations reaching Churchill felt that the dismissals of Wavell and Auchinleck were petty or vindictive. But in both cases he acted on advice and on his belief that change was in the immediate and urgent interest of the prosecution of the war.
    The third officer to be given the crucial North Africa command was General Bernard Montgomery (following the death in a plane crash of the general actually chosen to succeed Auchinleck). Montgomery had impressed Churchill in 1940, during the Prime Minister’s inspection of coastal defences on the eve of what was thought to be a German invasion, by his pugnacious attitude to what could be done if German troops were seen offshore (if they were able to reach the shore, Montgomery was prepared to consider the use of poison gas against them). When Montgomery was appointed to command in the Western Desert, Churchill wrote to his wife that, in the new commander, “we have a highly competent, daring, energetic soldier, well-acquainted with desert warfare.” Clementine Churchill had heard that Montgomery had created animosities in military circles: “If he is disagreeable to those about him,” Churchill replied, “he is also disagreeable to the enemy.” And to Montgomery himself, Churchill soon sent a message of praise for the fighting in North Africa: “Tell him how splendid we all think his work has been.”
    It was not only the military sphere that Churchill closely monitored. He was always quick to encourage those whose work he regarded highly. At the centre of all strategic deception plans (including “The Man Who Never Was” in the Mediterranean deception in 1943, and the bogus First United States Army Group deception leading the Germans to expect the 1944 Normandy landings to come from elsewhere), Churchill had full confidence in the innocuously named London Controlling Centre and its chief, Colonel John Bevan. Bevan’s professionalism and attention to detail required no prodding from Churchill and received none. Another of those whose work Churchill admired was the British diplomat Ronald Campbell, who had been at his side during his dramatic visits to France in June 1940. On receiving a report from