Free Das Reich by Max Hastings

key rail, road and telecommunications links on D-Day – Plans Vert , Tortue and Violet , in which both RF and F Sections had become deeply involved. SHAEF accepted these, on the basis that they cost nothing.
    At a meeting at Special Forces headquarters on 20 May, Allied policy crystallized thus:
    The immediate offensive task of Resistance will be to give every assistance possible towards the build-up of the lodgement area:
    a)  
by the delaying of, and interference with, the movement of enemy reinforcements towards the area, and subsequently by attacks on his lines of supply.
b)  
by creating, in areas remote from the lodgement area, diversionary threats that the enemy cannot afford to neglect, thereby tying down a proportion of his available forces.
    It must also be envisaged that, even in districts of vital importance to the enemy, the population may not remain inactive. Spontaneous popular activity may combine with the efforts of remaining Resistance to develop to a design of individually small but widespread guerilla activity.
    An SFHQ memorandum of 4 June said: ‘It cannot be foreseen how Resistance will react to Overlord. It is clear that we must, generally speaking, reinforce where Resistance is most strong. Our policy will therefore be largely opportunist.’
    One critical dilemma was unresolved until the last moment: whether to attempt a selective mobilization of Resistance, sparing those areas most remote from and irrelevant to the Normandy battle from the inevitable consequences of German counter-attack. The overwhelming conclusion was that it was neither desirable nor possible to restrain whole areas of France from taking part at the great moment: ‘In view of the fact that the spirit of Resistance groups throughout France is keyed up to a high pitch, and that a wave of patriotic enthusiasm is likely to sweep the country on D-Day, it is considered that any restraint placed on certain areas of organized Resistance on D-Day would only meet with partial success.’
    Thus it was agreed that at the moment of the landings, all the résistants of France would be called to arms. Beyond the practical difficulties of restraining them, it was vital to keep the Germans in doubt for every possible day about the prospect of furtherAllied landings. Colonel Barry of SOE said: ‘We were, in an absolutely hard-headed way, sacrificing Frenchmen to that purpose.’ The Allied staffs expected that any benefits from Resistance would continue at best for a few days. ‘It is probable that action . . . will be taken for a few days, after which stores and enthusiasm will begin to run low unless further instructions, backed by supplies, are speedily issued,’ ran an SFHQ memorandum. By the end of May, there were believed to be around half a million active résistants in France. Of these, 10,000 were estimated to be already armed by RF Section in Region R5 – comprising the Dordogne, Corrèze, Haute-Vienne and Creuse – the principal battleground of the Das Reich, and some 9,000 in R4, south-westwards from the Lot; 16,000 men in R4 and 2,500 men in R5 were believed to be already armed by F Section. According to SFHQ figures, 75,975 Sten guns, 27,025 pistols, 9,420 rifles, 2,538 Brens, anti-tank rifles and bazookas, 285,660 grenades and 183 tons of explosives and ammunition had been dropped to the Resistance, of which a significant but unknown proportion had been unrecovered by reception committees or lost to the Germans. There was a chronic shortage of ammunition of all types. Most résistants possessed two, three, sometimes only a single magazine for their arms, and there were few reserves. They had no heavy weapons beyond a few bazookas, despite constant pleading from the bigger groups in the field. But there were excellent reasons for this. Heavy weapons required training and transport, to neither of which most maquisards had access. To be effective, they required stocks of ammunition which it would have been immensely difficult