doc. 117.
20 Ibid., doc. 134.
21 G. Gorodetsky,
Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 121â24.
22 M. V. Zakharov,
Generalânyi Shtab v Predvoennye Gody
(Moscow: Ast, 1989), pp. 220â24.
23
1941 God
, vol. 1, doc. 224.
24 Zhukov,
Reminiscences
, vol. 1, p. 121.
25 I. Kh. Bagramyan,
Tak Shli My k Pobede
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977), pp. 7â9.
26 V. A. Afanasâev,
Stanovlenie Polkovodcheskogo Iskusstva G. K. Zhukova
(Moscow: Svyatigor, 2006), pp. 110â13.
27 The record of the conference proceedings may be found in âNakanune Voiny: Materialy Soveshchaniya Vyschego Rukovodyashchego Sostava RKKA 23â31 Dekabrya 1940g,â
Russkii Arkhiv: Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina, 1941â1945
, vol. 12 (1) (Moscow: Terra, 1993).
28 G. Zhukov, âKharakter Sovremnnoi Nastupatelânoi Operatsii,â in ibid., pp. 129â51.
29 Ibid., pp. 152â72.
30 D. G. Pavlov, âIspolâzovanie Mekhanizirovannykh Soedinenii v Sovremennoi Nasupatelânoi Operatsi i Vvod Mekhanizirovannogo Korpusa v Proryv,â in ibid., pp. 252â300. On Pavlovâs role in the development of Soviet tank doctrine, see M. R. Habeck,
Storm of Steel: The Development of Armour Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919â1939
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003), passim.
31 âZakluchitelânaya Rechâ Narodnogo Komissara Oborony Souza SSR Geroya i Marshala Sovetskogo Souza S.K. Timoshenko na Voennom Soveshchanii 31 Dekabrya 1940g,â
Russkii Arkhiv: Velikaya Otechestven naya Voina, 1941â1945
, vol. 12 (1) (Moscow: Terra, 1993), pp. 338â72.
32
Na Priyome u Stalina
, p. 322.
33 The fullest version of this episode may be found in the unexpurgated edition of Zhukovâs memoirs: Zhukov,
Vospominaniya
, vol. 1, pp. 291â92. It seems that Stalinâs corrections were taken into account by Timoshenko prior to the publication of his speech as a booklet for internal circulation with the armed forces. See
1941 God
, vol. 1, p. 498, no. 2. A copy of Timoshenkoâs speech as published in 1941 may be found in the Volkogonov Papers in the Library of Congress Manuscript Division.
34 On the war games, see Zakharov,
Generalânyi Shtab v Predvoennye Gody
, pp. 239â50; Gorodetsky,
Grand Delusion
, pp. 127â29; P. N. Bobylev, âK Kakoi Voine Gotovilsya Generalânyishtab RKKA v 1941 godu,â
Otechestvennaya Istoriya
, no. 5, 1995; and B. Fugate and L. Dvoretsky,
Thunder on the Dnepr: Zhukov-Stalin and the Defeat of Hitlerâs Blitzkrieg
(Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1997), chap. 1. Fugate and Dvoretskyâs treatment of the war games is commensurate with their hypothesis that the Soviet plan for coping with a German attack involved the deliberate sacrifice of Pavlovâs Western District with the aim of drawing the Wehrmacht deep into Russia before the launch of a counteroffensive, which finally came at Moscow in December 1941. In this connection they posit a third war game in February 1941, from which Pavlov was excluded, in which this scenario was played out. It is an intriguing, speculative idea but there is no direct evidence to support it; it gives Stalin, Zhukov, and Timoshenko far too much credit for prescience.
35 Cited by Chaney,
Zhukov
, p. 89.
36 E. Mawdsley, âCrossing the Rubicon: Soviet Plans for Offensive War in 1940â1941,â
International History Review
, December 2003, pp. 826â27.
37 K. Meretskov,
Serving the People
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), pp. 122â27;
Na Priyome u Stalina
, p. 322.
CHAPTER 6: ARCHITECT OF DISASTER?
  1 Zhukov,
Reminiscences
, vol. 1, pp. 379â80.
  2
Russkii Arkhiv: Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina, 1941â1945
, vol. 13 (1), Prikazy Narodnogo Komissara Oborony SSSR, 1937â41, Iunya 1941g (Moscow: Terra, 1994), doc. 108.
  3 On Soviet-German relations in 1939â1941,