Free Luftwaffe Fighter Aces by Mike Spick Page A

‘down to their last 50 Spitfires’. Now it really seemed possible.
    Sunday 15 September saw a resumption of the offensive. About 150 Bf 109s drawn from several
Gruppen
set course for the capital In their midst was the bait—a mere 25 Dorniers drawn from
I
and
III/KG 76.
Fighter Command scrambled 23 squadrons, and the wished-for fighter battle began. The first encounters took place near Maidstone and continued all the way to the outskirts of London. The
Jagdflieger
tried hard to protect their charges but, in spite of their best efforts, were peeled away and run short of fuel, leaving the bombers defenceless. Fighter combat often operates on a law of diminishing returns. The more aircraft in the dogfight, the lower the percentage that become casualties. And so it proved on this occasion in which honours were even—nine 109s lost against the same number of British fighters. Two Hurricanes fell to bombers, one in a collision, but the latter paid a terrible price: six of the 25 were shot down and two more damaged beyond repair.
    Launched in the early afternoon, the second raid followed the track of the first. The ‘bait’ was larger—some 114 bombers drawn from four different
Kampfgeschwader
, protected by 361 fighters! As before, the British fighters reacted in force and a running battle commenced which lasted from the coast to London itself.
    The fighting was fast and confused: with so many aircraft around, it was unwise to concentrate on one for more than a few seconds for this rendered the attacker vulnerable to surprise in his turn. Surprise was, and still is, the dominant factor in air fighting, whereas manoeuvre combat rarely produces decisive results. Adolf Galland, at the head of
JG 26
on this day, later recalled his 33rd victory:
After an unsuccessful dogfight with about eight Hurricanes, during which much altitude was lost, with the Staff flight I attacked two Hurricanes about 800m below us. Maintaining surprise, I closed on the wingman and opened fire from 120m as he was in a gentle turn to the left. The enemy plane reeled as my rounds struck the nose from below, and pieces fell from the left wing and fuselage. The left side of the fuselage burst into flame.
    It was fairly typical that dogfights against well-trained and mounted opponents were fruitless, even for a ‘honcho’ like Galland. Surprise attacks were far more likely to be effective, and it is significant that, even though Galland started out with a considerable altitude advantage, he ended attacking from the blind area below ( Fig. 11 ). Finally, the range was fairly short at 120m: too often pilots opened fire at 300m or more and failed to connect. Galland himself often closed to what he described as ‘ramming distance’.
    The running battle continued all the way to the target and back to the coast, where 50 Bf 109s, the ‘reception committee’, met the returning raiders. And still fresh British squadrons arrived to do battle! The afternoon action cost them fifteen fighters, while
Luftwaffe
losses amounted to 21 bombers and at least twelve fighters, possibly more.
    September 15 was a bad day for the
Jagdflieger,
It showed clearly that they were nowhere near gaining ascendancy over the British fighters. In fact the enemy seemed stronger than ever, notwithstanding the weeks and months of heavy fighting. The invasion was postponed indefinitely. The night Blitz took on increasing importance, and after heavy losses in major raids on London on 27 and 30 September the daylight assault on the capital was quietly terminated.
Phase 4: I October to 31 December
    The experimental
EprGr 210
had used Bf 109s and 110s as fighter-bombers from July, with a fair degree of success. Encouraged by this,
Reichsmarschall
Goering ordered in early September that up to one-third of all fighters must be equipped for the
Jagdbomber (Jabo)
role. Twenty-one Bf 109Es of
II/LG 2
had taken a minor part in raiding London on 15 September.
    Flying high and fast, the
Jabos
were