Free Luftwaffe Fighter Aces by Mike Spick

dive bombers, which were withdrawn from operations after a terrible beating on 18 August. The
Jagdflieger
had fought hard to protect them, as witnessed by the loss of 56 Bf 109s and 63 Bf 110s. RAF fighter losses in combat came to just under 100 for this period, although overclaiming fooled
Luftwaffe
intelligence into thinking they were far higher. This notwithstanding, the hard fact was that
Luftwaffe
combat losses were averaging an unacceptable 49 aircraft a day for the first five full days (bad weather on 17 August restricted operations and there were no combat losses on either side).
    The German bomber crews complained bitterly about the lack of fighter protection, and instructions were given that in future the majority of the fighters would fly close escort, tied to the bombers to ward off the British interceptors. A further measure taken at about this time was to replace several fighter leaders with young and successful pilots. Adolf Galland, promoted to command
JG 26,
was one of the first to benefit from this change, which took effect right down the line. He was replacedas
Kommandeur
of
III/JG 26
by Gerhard Schöpfel, and Heinz Ebeling took over
9/
JG 26
from Schöpfel. Other new
Kommodoren
appointed were Günther Lützow to
JG 3,
Hans Trübenbach to
JG 52
and Hannes Trautloft to
JG 54.
    The infusion of new leadership in the air appears to have made an almost immediate difference. Although the
Jagdflieger
did not like being tied to the bombers as close escort, claiming with some justification that their advantages of speed, altitude and initiative were being wasted, the fact remains that combat attrition fell to an average of 21 aircraft a day over the final fortnight—a reduction of 60 per cent. Bombers and Bf 110s benefited most: average combat losses for the single-seaters remained at eleven fighters a day! The average loss rate of British fighters remained unchanged at nineteen aircraft a day during this period.
    Werner Mölders saw himself as the successor to Oswald Boelcke, the Great War ace generally acclaimed as the ‘father of air fighting’. Galland, on the other hand, regarded himself as the Richthofen of the Second World War. Both were concerned to improve their tactics. The Bf 109 was at a disadvantage in the dogfight against the better-turning Spitfires and Hurricanes. They came up with the only possible solution, which was to fight in the vertical, using initial altitude advantage to plummet down, fire, then, using their accumulated speed, climb away again. But often the situation did not allow this: Galland twice found Spitfires on his tail which he was unable to shake off. His unorthodox ploy on both occasions was to fire his guns into the blue. Seeing gunsmoke coming back, and perhaps showered with spent cases, his pursuers, possibly thinking that they had encountered a fighter with rearward-firing guns, broke off the chase.
Phase 3: 7 to 30 September
    By early September it had become increasingly obvious that Fighter Command had not been defeated in the air, nor were its aircraft being destroyed on the ground in significant numbers. If airfield attacks had not worked, a new target was needed. London! Surely the British would throw in every last fighter to defend the capital. Many fighter units from
Luftflotte 3
were redeployed to the Pas-de-Calais to give a massive numerical advantage.
    In the mid-afternoon of 7 September, a massive armada of 350 bombers, escorted by more than 600 fighters, set course for the metropolis. Caught out of position by this change of targets, the defenders offered little resistance. The huge raid steamrollered its way through and inflicted massive damage on the Dockland area. German losses were a mere ten bombers and 22 fighters; RAF losses were 29.
    London was again the target on 11 September, then came a relative lull for three days. Fighter Command had performed unimpressively since early September. For some while the German parrot cry had been that the British were