Free Battleship Bismarck by Burkard Baron Von Mullenheim-Rechberg Page A

declared that if there was to be no change in the plan to send the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen out as a pair, either it should be done as soon as the latter was repaired, or they should wait for the next new moon after the one just waning. But there were also valid reasons for awaiting the availability of the Scharnhorst , which was still in the midst of an engine overhaul, if not for the Tirpitz , which was nearing completion, as well. The appearance of all four would make the operation much more effective than it would be with a “teaspoon” deployment now. Lastly, if one of our new and powerful battleships were to appear now as a commerce-raider, the enemy would have time to take countermeasures that would reduce the prospect for success when joint operations became possible. Nevertheless, it was deemed wiser to resume the Battle of the Atlantic as soon as possible: in plain language, the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen should not await reinforcement, they should go into action right away.
    And with this return to the original operation order, Lütjens came to agree fully and completely with the basic thinking of Raeder. In Raeder’s opinion, any interruption in the battle against Great Britain’s Atlantic commerce could only strengthen the enemy. Furthermore, in the northern latitudes the passing season was bringing ever shorter nights and every delay increased the difficulty of reaching the Atlantic under cover of darkness. But, he told Lütjens: “Deliberate, careful operations are indicated. It would be a mistake to risk a heavy engagement for limited and perhaps uncertain results. Our objective with the Bismarck and, later, the Tirpitz must be continuous, sustained operations.”
    Act boldly against convoys—keep heavy British escorts tied down but don’t get into action unless it serves the primary mission and can be done without excessive risk—if battle becomes unavoidable, conduct it with full force—operate deliberately and carefully—such were the conflicting demands laid upon the Fleet Commander. How often was Lütjens going to have the heavy responsibility of deciding when to forgo an irretrievable tactical opportunity and when to take it. His mission was far from simple.
    After his meeting with Raeder, Lütjens stopped briefly in the office of the future Rear Admiral (Engineer) Hans Voss, who was then assigned to the Oberkommando der Marine. “Voss,” he said, “I’d like to make my farewells; I’ll never come back.” When Voss looked at him questioningly, he added, “Given the superiority of the British, survival is improbable.”
     
    * The Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen
    † The Scharnhorst was undergoing a lengthy overhaul of her engines.
    * “Weisung für weitere Unternehmungen von Überwasserstreitkräften.” Skl. 1 Op 410/41 Gkdos Chefsache, 2. IV. 1941. For the full text, see Appendix A.
    † An intermediate rank between admiral and fleet admiral for which there is no American or English equivalent.
    ‡ “Operationsbefehl des Flottenchefs für die Atlantikoperation mit ‘Bismarck’ und ‘Prinz Eugen’ (Deckbezeichnung ‘Rheinübung’),” Flottenkommando B. Nr. Gkdos 100/41 Al Chefsache o 22. IV. 1941, Annex I: “Allgemeiner Befehl für die Atlantikunternehmung,” is reproduced in Appendix B.

 
     
  
6
       Another Postponement and Last Liberty
    “Anxiety to get into our first battle,” wrote a twenty-four-year-old petty officer, “reached fever pitch, and tension was kept high by numerous rumors that we were about to go into action.”
    By the end of April the Bismarck was provisioned for three months at sea. This meant that, among other things, she had embarked enough pork and beef to feed a city of 250,000 inhabitants for one day. On the twenty-eighth, Lindemann reported to the Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, Naval Group North, Naval Group West, and the Fleet Commander that his ship was fully operational in terms of men and material. In the War Diary, he noted: “The crew,