Free Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang by Adi Ignatius Page B

held, who would attend, or what other items were to be on the agenda.
    His speech even included the statement, “The student demonstrations escalated after May Fourth.” Later, they must have felt that the statement too blatantly placed the blame on my May Fourth speech, so when it was published in the newspapers, it was changed to “The student demonstrations escalated in early May.” This was an open implication that my May Fourth speech had caused the escalation of demonstrations. Li Peng also announced to members of the State Council that I had made a big mistake. They also held an exclusive meeting prior to the larger meeting to announce martial law.
    All of this added to my realization that I had been excluded from decision making. To this day, I still don’t know when that decision was made. On the 17th at Deng’s place, when deciding to impose martial law, even though Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, and Qiao Shi were appointed to conduct the affair, Deng also noted that “Zhao is still the General Secretary.” But in fact, in the several days that followed, I was entirely pushed aside.
    On the 19th, I applied for a three-day leave from the Politburo. I suggested that Li Peng chair the Politburo Standing Committee and refused to attend the mobilization meeting to announce martial law.
    At the time, the number of demonstrators supporting the hunger strike in Tiananmen Square had become much smaller. The hunger strike was abandoned and turned into a sit-in. Many of the Beijing university students had already returned to their schools. Those who remained in the square were mostly students from other cities.
    The announcement of martial law on May 19 [actually May 20] was another stimulant, once again mobilizing the masses. Participants of the sit-in increased and supporters from other social groups crowded the streets. Beijing residents were particularly aggrieved by the decision to call troops to Beijing to execute martial law. Troops that received their orders were blocked along their way, everywhere. Groups of old ladies and children slept on the roads. Troops were stopped in the suburbs of Beijing, unable to enter the city. The standoff lasted more than ten days.
    On May 21, Qiao Shi came to my house to discuss the situation. He said, “Quite a number of people are feeling like they are ‘riding a tiger, unable to get off.’ If it were not for Deng’s insistence and his decision to call more troops to Beijing, a great tragedy might be avoided. But now the troops have been blocked from entering, martial law is ineffective, and millions of students, residents, workers, and cadres from government organizations are out on the streets or gathered on Tiananmen Square. If this continues, the capital is in danger of becoming paralyzed.”
    At that moment, I thought that perhaps if we held the National People’s Congress Standing Committee meeting ahead of schedule we could allow the NPC, the organization with proper authority, to use the means of democracy and law to turn the situation around. On May 21, I spoke to [Central Committee Secretariat member] Yan Mingfu about this idea, and asked him to speak with [Yang] Shangkun to see if it was feasible.
    Before this, [NPC vice chairman] Peng Chong had come over to talk. He said that since Wan Li was abroad, he [Peng Chong] had held a meeting with the heads of the NPC committee. They all felt that an NPC Standing Committee meeting should be held. He also went to Yuquanshan [Jade Spring Mountain, west of Beijing] to visit [influential Party elder] Peng Zhen, who also agreed that this should be done. They had already written a report to the Central Committee requesting that Wan Li return from abroad ahead of schedule.
    In the afternoon of the 21st, [PSC member] Hu Qili came to my house to report that no one had responded to the request to have Wan Li return. It was in limbo. I asked Hu Qili to tell Peng Chong to telegram Wan Li directly in the name of the Party Group of the NPC