Free Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang by Adi Ignatius

to move troops into Beijing to impose martial law.”
    He also appointed Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, and Qiao Shi as a three-person team to implement the imposition of martial law.
    When Deng was finished, I said that having a decision was always better than not having one, but I was extremely worried about the grave consequences this would have. As General Secretary, it would be difficult for me to manage and effectively carry out this decision. Deng said, “If this turns out to be a wrong decision, we will all be responsible.”
    During this meeting, Li Peng also claimed that contents of Politburo Standing Committee meetings had been leaked to the public, and that there were some bad elements on the inside, [Political Secretary of the PSC] Bao Tong being one of them. I replied, “You must be responsible when making such claims! What evidence do you have?” He said, “I do have evidence that I will reveal to you later.”
    I walked out as soon as the meeting adjourned. If Deng asked the others to remain or discussed other matters, I never knew.
    At that moment, I was extremely upset. I told myself that no matter what, I refused to become the General Secretary who mobilized the military to crack down on students. Upon returning home, under heightened emotions, I called on Bao Tong to draft a letter of resignation for me to send to the Standing Committee.
    At that evening’s meeting to brief the Standing Committee, I refused to accept the assignment to chair the meeting of cadres to announce martial law. I said, “It seems my mission in history has already ended.” Yang Shangkun replied to me, “This kind of issue cannot be raised now. No changes in leadership should be made.” He meant that my position as General Secretary should not be changed.
    As soon as my letter of resignation reached the Service Bureau of the Central Committee General Office, Shangkun found out about it. He phoned me and repeatedly beseeched me to revoke my decision. Shangkun said, “If this information leaks out, then the situation will be even worse. We should not pour gasoline on a flame.”
    I conceded his argument and on May 18 notified the General Office to halt the distribution of the letter. My secretary [Li Shuqiao] later retrieved it.
    Here I would like to clarify something about this meeting called by Deng that resolved to impose martial law and crack down on the students. There has been public hearsay that the Politburo Standing Committee meeting resulted in a vote of three against two, but in fact there was no “three versus two” vote. There were only a few people in attendance. Among the members of the Standing Committee, it was two against two: Hu Qili and I were for revising the editorial, Yao Yilin and Li Peng were ardently opposed, and Qiao Shi remained neutral by not expressing any clear view.
    There was no such thing as a “three versus two” vote. Of course, if the opinions of Deng and Yang, who were not members of the Standing Committee, were added, in the overall count of all the people who attended that meeting, they were certainly a majority. However, in fact, the Standing Committee held no formal vote.
    During those few days, many prominent people and senior Party comrades phoned or wrote letters to me and to the Central Committee, appealing to us to treat the students properly, to acknowledge that the students’ actions had been patriotic, and to change the wrongful stance assumed toward the students. Among them were those whom Deng Xiaoping had always held in high regard, such as senior comrades like Li Yimang.
    On May 18, I forwarded a selection of these letters to Deng and wrote to him to reiterate my position, hoping he would reconsider. Though I knew there was very little hope of this, I had to make one last attempt. The original text of my letter is as follows:
    Comrade Xiaoping,
     
    I have forwarded several appeals from influential senior comrades. I hope you will read them.
    The current situation is