Free The Imjin War by Samuel Hawley

Ambassador Hwang Yun-gil, who had led the “goodwill mission” to Kyoto in 1590, had warned the court in Seoul that Hideyoshi posed a real threat, and many believed him. Even Vice-Ambassador Kim Song-il, who officially contradicted everything Hwang said and sparked the dispute between the Eastern and Western factions over whether or not there would be a war, confided to fellow Easterner Yu Song-nyong, now Minister of the Left, [127] that he had not really meant what he said. “I also feel that there is no alternative, as in the end the Japanese will unleash war,” he said. “But Hwang’s words were too pessimistic, and those inside and outside the court will become bewildered and lose their self-control. That is the reason why I said what I did.” [128]
    A fight was clearly coming with Japan. Hwang and the Westerners knew it. Kim and the Easterners knew it. A full-blown invasion that would devastate the country and permanently cripple the dynasty was not expected. But something resembling a large wako pirate raid was. The Koreans had faced Japanese pirates on many occasions before, most recently in the 1550s. The official histories of the Choson dynasty and preceding Koryo dynasty made it clear that when Korea was unprepared, these marauders were capable of doing tremendous harm, but that with preparation they could be dealt with. So clearly preparation was required. But what sort of preparation? And how much? And where to start?
    And what, in the meantime, should they tell Ming China?
    The China issue arose upon the return of the Korean mission from Kyoto in the spring of 1591, bearing the letter from Hideyoshi that left no doubt as to his intentions: he wanted to invade the Middle Kingdom and usurp the Celestial Throne. To the Koreans, Hideyoshi’s conceit was not only shocking, it was distasteful and obscene, and they were sorry they had ever exchanged envoys with him. Some members of the government now began to worry that China might think Korea had stepped beyond the bounds of the vassal–sovereign relationship by establishing relations with this Japanese barbarian without prior Ming approval, and feared that Beijing would be angry if it found out. “I am afraid,” said Prime Minister Yi San-hae, “that unless we conceal the fact, the Imperial Court will consider it was a criminal act for us to have carried out an exchange of envoys with Japan on our own volition.”
    Minister of the Left Yu Song-nyong did not agree. He argued that, as a loyal vassal of China, Korea was duty-bound to inform the Ming court of these latest developments and to warn it of the looming threat posed by Japan. “Indeed,” he added, “if those robbers really plan to invade China, others may inform the Emperor. Then the Celestial Court will unjustly suspect that we have concealed this business because we are in accord with the Japanese.”
    That was in fact exactly what was going on. By early 1591 word had already reached Beijing from elsewhere of Hideyoshi’s plans for conquest, first from envoys dispatched by King Shonei of the Ryukyu Islands, then from separate messages sent by two Chinese men residing in Japan. Beijing awaited corroborative reports from Seoul, but the months passed and no word arrived, leading some to question the loyalty of Little China, and even to suspect that it might be somehow in league with Japan. Only Prime Minister Xu Guo, a former ambassador to the Choson court, stood up for Korea. “Korea has remained loyal to sadae [serving the great],” he said. “It cannot be in agreement with the rebellious spirit of the Japanese. Just wait awhile.” [129]
    Beijing waited. And the Koreans continued to talk. In the meantime, Inspector-General Yun Tu-su, who agreed with Yu Song-nyong about the need to inform the Ming of the threat posed by Japan, privately wrote a report of his own and gave it to Kim Ung-nam, the ambassador of a tribute mission then about to depart for Beijing, with orders to deliver it as soon