Free Oswald and the CIA: The Documented Truth About the Unknown Relationship Between the U.S. Government and the Alleged Killer of JFK by John Newman Page B

reasonable. The question is, how could the CIA possibly avoid drawing the same conclusion?
    Among the concerns the Agency might have had about Oswald's intentions would certainly be the possibility of revelations about the U-2 in the media. Fortunately, from the Agency's perspective, this did not happen even after a U-2 was shot down in May 1960 in the Soviet Union. The American Embassy in Moscow had not notified the press of Oswald's threats at the time of his defection. Moreover, the only reporter who knew about it did not, for reasons we will examine in Chapter Five, use it. Oswald's threat to give up secrets to the Soviets remained classified until after the Kennedy assassination.
    We may not find out any time soon-at least as far as hard documentary evidence is concerned-what the CIA concluded about Oswald's possible role in the May 1960 U-2 shootdown and about the related question of what else he might have compromised about American U-2 operations. In one sense, however, we don't have to. Something that Captain Donovan said right after the Kennedy assassination goes straight to the heart of the matter. Donovan explained that he "did not know whether Oswald actually turned over secrets to the Russians. But for security's sake it had to be assumed that he did.' 121 What Donovan said then is still the standard operating procedure for any intelligence organization today, and it was certainly true with respect to the U-2 program in 1959. Corpsman Hobbs pointed out to the ONI in 1964 that "one year after Oswald visited Russia, J. F. Powers [sic] was captured."26 ONI Agent Berlin's report concluded: "Since it was common knowledge around the base that the U-2s were being utilized for recon flights, Hobbs now believes that Oswald could have given that information to Russia."

    It is reasonable to assume that someone at the CIA might have concluded the same thing that Corpsman Hobbs did. From the newly released files come fresh hints that someone took a hard look at what damage Oswald might have done to the U-2 program after he defected. This new detail has emerged: By August 19, 1960-three and a half months after U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers was shot down in the Soviet Union-all CIA personnel and every piece of their equipment at Atsugi had "cleared the base and turned the facilities back to the Navy."27 The Oswald defection in October 1959 must be considered in the context of his knowledge of the U2 program. That this is so can readily be seen from examining how sensitive the U-2 program and Oswald's knowledge really were.
    Oswald and the U-2: How Sensitive?
    The Soviet ballistic missile program began in spring 1957. Detachment C, the CIA U-2 spy mission at Atsugi Naval Air Station, Japan, was operational by the week of April 8, 1957. By March 1958, ten to fifteen Soviet ICBMs had been launched to distances of up to 3700 miles. Thus, Atsugi was an ideal location from which to launch espionage flights to collect the Far East end-presumably impact areas-of the evidence of these test launches. The first American intelligence report on a successful Soviet test launch of an ICBM landed on President Eisenhower's desk in late August 1957. Lee Harvey Oswald arrived at the Atsugi Naval Air Station on September 12, 1957. Twenty-two days later, the Soviet Union launched the Soviet satellite Sputnik on the tip of an intercontinental ballistic missile.

    The Soviets followed with more launches, and an American attempt failed. This series of events jolted America's sense of its own preeminence in science and technology, and a top secret report by the Gaither Committee recommended that the United States engage in an all-out effort to close the "missile gap." Khrushchev fed these American fears by hinting at an intercontinental capability and his willingness to use it. The missile gap, however, was not-nor would it ever be-concrete. The deployments were anticipated, and CIA intelligence estimates in 1958 and 1959 projected the early prospects