Free Ostkrieg by Stephen G. Fritz Page A

atmosphere at the front on the eve of Barbarossa, see Grupe,
Jahrgang 1916
, 149–51; Lubbeck,
At Leningrad’s Gates
, 84; Knappe,
Soldat
, 178–80; Schröder, “German Soldiers’ Experiences,” 309–24, and
Die gestohlenen Jahre;
Wette, “ ‘Es roch nach Ungeheuerlichem,’ ” 71–73; Fuchs,
Wer spricht von Siegen
, 12; Kuby,
Mein Krieg
, 95–99; Stahlberg,
Bounden Duty
, 160–62; and Hitler’s “Aufruf an die Soldaten der Ostfront vom 22. 6. 41,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds.,
“Unternehmen Barbarossa
,” 319–23.
    2 . Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 192; DiNardo,
Mechanized Juggernaut?
40–50; Hoffmann, “Die Sowjetunion bis zum Vorabend des deutschen Angriffs,” 88–99; Rotundo, “Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941,” 280–81; Glantz,
Barbarossa
, 27; Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 452–54; Förster, “The Dynamics of Volksgemeinschaft,” 195.
    3 . Halder,
War Diary
, 22 June 1941, 410–12. Proponents of the idea that Stalin intended a strike against Germany include Suvorov,
Icebreaker;
Topitsch,
Stalin’s War;
Raack, “Stalin’s Plans for World War II”; and Hoffmann, “The Soviet Union’s Offensive Preparations in 1941.”
    For good historiographic assessments and critiques of this argument, see Uldricks, “The Icebreaker Controversy”; Pietrow-Ennker,
Präventivkrieg?
and “Deutschland im Juni 1941”; Förster, “Die Grosse Täuschung”; Ueberschär, “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’ gegen die Sowjetunion”; and Gorodetsky, “Was Stalin Planning to Attack Hitler in June 1941?” “Stalin and Hitler’s Attack on the Soviet Union,” and “Stalin und Hitlers Angriff auf die Sowjetunion.” For a balanced assessment of Stalin’s perceptions of the Wehrmacht, see Arlt, “Die Wehrmacht im Kalkül Stalins,” 105–11.
    4 . Rotundo, “Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941,” 289–96; Gorodetsky, “Stalin and Hitler’s Attack on the Soviet Union,” 346–50, and
Grand Delusion
, chaps. 8, 12; Churchill,
The Grand Alliance
, 55; Litvinov quoted in Gorodetsky, “Was Stalin Planning to Attack Hitler in June 1941?” 72.
    5 . Rotundo, “Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941,” 289–96; Gorodetsky,
Grand Deception
, chap. 6, and “Stalin and Hitler’s Attack on the Soviet Union,” 346–47, 355–56; Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, 32–41;
TBJG
, 16 June 1941.
    6 . Rotundo, “Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941,” 284–85, 290–92, 295–96; Uldricks, “The Icebreaker Controversy,” 635–36; Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, 32–37.
    7 . Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, 32–37; Churchill,
The Hinge of Fate
, 493; Gorodetsky, “Stalin and Hitler’s Attack on the Soviet Union,” 357–59.
    8 . Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 172; Rotundo, “Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941,” 280–81; Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, 26–31, 42–43, 46–51. Although, as is often supposed, the Soviets had made no special effort in the 1930s to expand industry across the Urals, they had created new factories in the eastern part of European Russia between Moscow and the Urals.
    9 . Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, 44–46. For a good assessment of German intelligence failures, see Thomas, “Foreign Armies East.”
    10 . Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, 41–43; Förster, “Hitler’s Decision,” 48; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, chaps. 5–6; Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 456–57; Bock,
War Diary
, 31 January 1941, 196–97.
    11 . Clausewitz,
On War
, bk. 1, chap. 2.
    12 . Hayward, “Hitler’s Quest for Oil,” 99–103; Cooke and Nesbit,
Target, Hitler’s Oil
, 16;