Free Jessen & Richter (Eds.) by Voting for Hitler, Stalin; Elections Under 20th Century Dictatorships (2011)

(Fröhlich 1998-2006).

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    M A R K U S U R B A N
    constitutional law were interpreting this development as showing that there
    were no clear borders “between ‘election’ and ‘referendum’”, with both
    being “essentially one and the same” (Uhde 1936, 7; Hubert 1992, 235).
    Especially illuminating in this context is Gustav Uhde’s dissertation of
    1935, which clearly shows that the Gesetz über Volksabstimmung , which was passed in July 1933, and which made possible a referendum on an “intended measure”, had already become obsolete. In reality, it was measures
    that had already been decided that Hitler presented to the German people
    in the form of a Sachentscheidung (substantive decision), of which in Uhde’s view the Reichstag election was also a part, since voters only had to respond to the single question: “Do you stand on the side of the state, which has
    made this personnel decision [on the unified list of candidates of the pre-
    selected Reichstag members]?” (Uhde 1936, 19). And, since the Reichstag was solely an institution of acclamation, Uhde was able to draw the logical
    conclusion that it also had in the meantime become a plebiscitary instru-
    ment: “Today the Reichstag has a similar task to the referendum as […] do the people in entirety” (Ibid., 33). The fact that such developments caused
    not only the terminology but also the established certitudes of constitu-
    tional law to become muddled can be seen in the discussions on the topic
    within the academic discipline at the time. Even the established experts
    found it difficult to understand that, with respect to referenda, the legisla-
    tion could no longer develop in the traditional manner, but rather was
    modified purely through ideologically-motivated legal practice.14
    Given the rapid dissolution of the concept of the plebiscite, it also does
    not seem appropriate to speak, as Jung does, of a “factual abolition of the
    referendum” (Jung 1995, 82) after August 1934, since, in the eyes of the
    National Socialists, the 1936 Reichstag election largely concerned a plebiscitary process identical with the two referenda. On the other hand, the last
    instance of the use of a referendum in the Third Reich can be considered a
    special case. Austrian chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg, in his increasingly
    desperate attempt to resist the National Socialist pressure on his govern-
    ment, originally wanted to resort to the tool of the plebiscite and an-
    nounced on March 9, 1938 that a referendum would be held four days
    later. But then events came thick and fast, and Schuschnigg resigned two
    days after his announcement in the face of new German threats of military
    force. For Hitler, who then decided to carry out the immediate Anschluss of
    ——————
    14 At the same time that Uhde’s dissertation appeared, Wilhelm Stuckart spoke of the
    “fundamental philosophies of National Socialism, which had become common law”.

    T H E S E L F - S T A G I N G O F A P L E B I S C I T A R Y D I C T A T O R S H I P
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    Austria, canceling the referendum would have meant taking a certain
    propaganda risk. Therefore, he decided to hold a Greater German election to the Reichstag and two separate referenda—one in Austria and one in Germany—in order to legitimize the territorial expansion. With an election
    turnout and approval quota of 99 per cent each, the NS regime once again
    achieved superlative results. This was possibly due in part to a national
    frenzy that had been stirred up by the propaganda. At the same time,
    though, the results also posed the NS leadership with a problem of credi-
    bility, since the figures “were no longer taken seriously—neither by the
    majority of the population nor even by the regime’s own supporters”.15
    And a further problem, of course, was that there was simply no more
    room for improvement in the future.
    In the first six years of his rule, then, we can say that Hitler employed
    an instrument of