Free The Long Game by Derek Chollet Page A

problems.
    Therefore, the debate has always been over how most effectively to influence Russian behavior, especially when it turns negative. The policy struggle is about whether the United States should seek to engage or isolate Russia; whether our policies should do more to accommodate the Kremlin or confront it; and how one weighs the value of Russia’s cooperation abroad with its progress toward democracy at home.
    When Obama entered office, he found the relationship with Moscow adrift, believing that the accumulated differences of the previous decade had made it harder to work together on common endeavors—such as nuclear security, trade and economics, or dealingwith Iran and North Korea. There were still deep concerns about Russia’s political direction—in 2008 Putin had switched jobs with his prime minister, Dmitri Medvedev, but was still seen as the power behind the throne—as well as over the way Moscow dealt with its neighbors. Yet the administration believed it needed to find a way to work together on the issues where cooperation was possible. As Secretary Clinton put it: “Straight up transactional diplomacy isn’t always pretty, but often it’s necessary.” 9
    That was the core logic of the Russia “reset.” It was not, as the critics later insisted, some naïve attempt to work with Russia at all costs, to brush aside differences, or to establish a new era of harmony. The US-Russian relationship has always combined a mix of cooperation, competition, and disagreement, and the reset era was no exception. It was a policy driven by pragmatism, not ideology; to work with Russia where our interests converged, stand firm where they did not, and engage directly with the Russian people as they continued to press for political freedom and economic reforms.
    This approach paid dividends for a time. But it did not solve all our problems with Russia—and some would come roaring back as Obama’s tenure in office neared its end.
    T HE THIRD ASPECT of the reset was broader: to present a new face of the United States overseas.
    This was more than just an attempt to generate good feelings. It was an effort to reestablish the credibility and sense of legitimacy that had been lost during the post-9/11 era. This was a significant reason Obama chose Hillary Clinton to be his first secretary of state—both because of her widely respected skills but also the message it sent by placing a former political rival in such an important role. Some of this restoration was also achieved by early policy changes such as renouncing torture and pledging to close the Guantanamo Bay prison. But Obama aspired to somethingeven grander—to outline a new narrative for America’s global leadership.
    In a series of speeches in 2009, Obama set out to repair relationships and reintroduce America in order to, as he put it, “turn the page” on the George W. Bush era. The result was as ambitious a collection of foreign policy rhetoric as any president has delivered in a single year. Nearly all of the speeches were overseas, where Obama aimed to speak to great global challenges from the same perspective he had conveyed in Berlin—as a “citizen of the world.” Obama wanted to reach ordinary people, believing that his background, his identity, and his message could project a new way forward for America abroad. He also used these speeches to outline the ambitious policy agenda that he believed would be fundamental to winning the Long Game.
    In Prague, Obama detailed his plan to deal with the issue that still concerned him most, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and outlined his aspiration to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world. In Ankara, Obama went to the Turkish parliament and pledged that the United States was not at war with Islam. In Accra, Obama stood before the Ghanian parliament and explained his hopes for democracy and development, urging Africans to embrace not