Free The Long Game by Derek Chollet Page B

“strong men” but “strong institutions.” In Moscow, Obama spoke of his hopes for greater global cooperation, observing that “the pursuit of power is no longer a zero-sum game” and that “progress must be shared.” And in Oslo, where Obama accepted the Nobel Peace Prize—an award he admitted was given prematurely, reflecting more hope than accomplishment—he delivered a message that the use of military force was at times necessary.
    T HE MOST HIGH-PROFILE of these speeches was delivered on June 4, 2009 in Egypt, where Obama took the stage in front of an audience of 3,000 people at Cairo University to speak about America’s relationship with the Muslim world. This was, as the writer JamesTraub observed, “the most ambitious, the most eagerly anticipated, and the most excruciatingly crafted foreign policy address of [Obama’s] first term and perhaps of his presidency.” 10
    Obama spoke candidly about the tension between the United States and many of the world’s Muslims, blaming “small but potent” extreme minorities on both sides who “sow hatred rather than peace,” fueling a “cycle of suspicion and discord.” He said the United States needed to accept its share of the blame, citing the legacy of colonialism and Cold War policies where Arab states were treated more as pawns than partners. By acknowledging such fallibility, Obama exposed himself to critics back home who decried his “apologizing” for America. But this concession was instrumental to the president’s argument—by acknowledging America’s own imperfections, Obama forced his listeners to consider their own.
    Obama outlined his desire to launch a “new beginning” with the Muslim world. He did not promise any large policy shifts or announce any major policy “deliverables”—he continued to support Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, reiterated his commitment to fight terrorists, and pledged to work hard to achieve peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Instead, Obama offered something less tangible: a promise to engage Muslims with “mutual interest and mutual respect.”
    These words were well received, and for a time the Cairo message seemed to improve things. But it was soon undermined by the expectations it had created. Obama hoped, as Traub observed, a “change at the level of thought and feeling would in turn help bring about a change in policy.” Obama later said that he had intended to show that “the US would help, in whatever way possible, to advance the goals of a practical, successful Arab agenda that provided a better life for ordinary people.” 11 That sounded good, but left the Muslim world wanting more. If there is a lasting lesson from the Cairo speech, it is that while the use of words to create new narratives is necessary toreset the image of American leadership, words alone are not sufficient. Actions are needed, too.
    Yet from the perspective of 2016, when the question of America’s relationship with the Muslim world has again become politically explosive—exposing a strain of intolerant demagoguery in US politics—the core of Obama’s message seven years ago in Cairo remains essential. As Obama said, “Islam is a part of America.”
    RESURGE
    These efforts to rebalance US foreign policy and reset the image of America in the world unfolded against the backdrop of armed conflict. Although Obama championed a message of peace, he remained a president at war. His decisions on fighting and ending the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would be among the most consequential that he would make. Which brings us to the third component of Obama’s initial strategic shift: resurge.
    Of all the tough decisions Obama confronted during his first year, perhaps the most difficult concerned the war in Afghanistan. During the 2008 campaign, Obama had made the flagging war effort in