Free 1999 by Richard Nixon

abroad.
    Unfortunately, American policy toward the Soviet Union has swung back and forth between hopes for perfect peace between Washington and Moscow and fears of total war between the nuclear superpowers.
    From the start of the Cold War until 1969, the United States policy was containment. It sought to encircle the Soviet Union with a string of alliances and thereby block Soviet expansionism. It was based on the assumption that in time internal forces would prompt Moscow to reform its political system and mend its aggressive ways. It was totally defensive, avoiding any American actions that might provoke the Soviet Union.
    That policy succeeded in the short run but failed in the long run. Its hopeful prediction has not come about. Except for NATO, all of the great alliances sponsored by the United States have long since crumbled. As early as the 1950s, Moscow broke out of containment, leapfrogging our alliances to set up a relationship first with Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, then with several nationalist leaders in Africa, and finally with Fidel Castro in Cuba. The Kremlin now has a string of clients and satellites throughout the world, running from Libya on the Mediterranean Sea to Cuba on the Caribbean Sea, to Vietnam on the South China Sea, to South Yemen on the Arabian Sea, and to Ethiopia on the Red Sea. Containment doomed America to constantly responding to Soviet probes at Western weak points. In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States was trapped in a policy of running around the globe putting out brushfire wars as fast as the Soviet Union started them. Since the arsonist always has the strategic initiative, he also has theadvantage over the fireman. In the long run, containment was a prescription for defeat.
    Starting in 1969, the United States pursued a policy of hard-headed détente. As distinguished from an entente, which is an agreement between powers with common interests, détente is an agreement between powers with different interests. It did not mean that the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on all issues. Instead, it meant that while we disagreed on most issues, we wanted to work out agreements on some and did not want to go to war over any.
    Hardheaded détente sought to combine détente with deterrence. A reduction in tensions did not mean a reduction in vigilance. America maintained a strength of arms and a strength of will sufficient to blunt the threat of Soviet expansion and blackmail. The United States was prepared to stop Soviet aggression, direct and indirect, not only with diplomatic pressures but also with military ones. It did not reassure those who were threatening its interests that it would not use force unless attacked. Instead, it stated that the United States would do whatever was necessary to defend its interests and those of its allies.
    What was more important, America had the will to back up its words with actions. In 1970, as a result of U.S. pressure, the Soviet Union retreated from its attempt to establish a nuclear-submarine base at Cienfuegos in Cuba and from its effort, through Syria, to topple King Hussein of Jordan. In 1971, during the Indo–Pakistani war, it pulled in the reins on India when New Delhi sought to gobble up Pakistan. In 1972, after the United States bombed and mined Haiphong in response to a massive North Vietnamese offensive against South Vietnam, Moscow still went forward three weeks later with a planned U.S.–Soviet summit meeting. In 1973, after the United States put its forces on worldwide alert during the Arab–Israeli war, Moscow abandoned its threat to send its forces into the Middle East.
    For the Soviet leaders, the sharp deterrent edge of hardheaded détente did not make superpower talks worthless, but rather made the Americans worth talking to.
    Deterrence was combined with a mixture of prospective rewards for good behavior and penalties for bad behavior that gave theSoviet Union a positive incentive to keep the peace