Free Ace of Spies by Andrew Cook Page B

the source of fuel supply to the Navy. It was also clear to us that this would place the British Navy at a great disadvantage, because, whereas we possessed, within the British Isles, the best supply of the best steam coal in the world, a very small fraction of the known oilfields of the world lay within the British Dominions, and even those were situated in very distant and remote regions. Lord Selborne therefore decided to appoint a small Standing Committee to deal with this question and to take any steps they found possible to bring additional sources of petroleum supply under British control. I was appointed Chairman of this Committee and was assisted by Sir Boverton Redwood and the late Sir Henry Gordon Miller, then Mr Gordon Miller, Director of Navy Contracts. In the course of our investigations we learned through Sir Boverton Redwood that the late Mr D’Arcy had secured a valuable concession from the Persian government of the oil rights in southern Persia, and that he was negotiating for a similar concession from the Turkish Government for oil rights in Mesopotamia. We also ascertained that Mr D’Arcy was desirous of disposing of his rights under the Persian Concession to some financial Syndicate with the necessary capital and experience to undertake development operations. We further ascertained that D’Arcy was, at that moment, in the Riviera negotiating for the transfer of his concession to the French Rothschilds. I therefore wrote to Mr D’Arcy explaining to him the Admiralty’s interest in petroleum developmentand asking him, before parting with the concession to any foreign interests, to give the Admiralty an opportunity of endeavouring to arrange for its acquisition by a British Syndicate.
    I further asked him to come and see me on the subject. Mr D’Arcy accepted my invitation and returned from the Riviera to discuss the position with me. As a result of our conversation, the Committee approached the Burmah Oil Company with whom arrangements had already been made for emergency supplies of Naval Oil fuel, and, after investigating the prospects of the Persian Oil Field, they agreed to undertake its development and to form a Syndicate.
    D’Arcy had already spent over £150,000 in the search for oil over and above what he had spent in obtaining the concession in the first place. It was clear that he could not continue in this way. He soon found, however, that he was very much in a ‘chicken and egg’ position, as potential backers, including the British government, would have nothing to do with the project until oil was found. Then, in December 1903, there seemed to be hope in that Lord Rothschild, who had heard of D’Arcy’s venture, had expressed the view that it was of ‘great importance’. D’Arcy’s intermediary, Sir Arthur Ellis, met with Lord Rothschild and on 30 December wrote to D’Arcy to inform him that Rothschild would be writing to his cousin Baron Alphonse de Rothschild in Paris. It was indicated to the Rothschilds by Sir Arthur Ellis that £2 million would have to be spent in Persia. A personal meeting was therefore arranged between D’Arcy, who was accompanied by John Fletcher Moulton, and Baron de Rothschild in Cannes. According to the records of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, this meeting took place towards the end of February 1904. 34
    Pretyman’s letter also raises a number of other questions: why, for example, had the British government had such a quick and fundamental change of heart in now wanting to assist D’Arcy? Back in November of the previous year they had shown a distinct lack of enthusiasm for assisting him. Now, three short months later,they had not only a dramatic change of mind but were positively pursuing him to the negotiating table.
    It may well be that in December 1903 the government view was that in the absence of any other potential D’Arcy backers they could afford to wait for a sign of the concession’s potential before committing any money. The situation