Free Beyond Bin Laden by Jon Meacham

Pakistan. To be sure, Pakistan is a weak state. But this weakness results more than anything from internal divisions and poor governance. If Pakistan fails, it will be less because of insurgents coming across its borders than from decay within them.
    It is hard to imagine a more complicated bilateral relationship than the one between Washington and Islamabad. Pakistan is at most a limited partner; it is not an ally, and at times it is not even a partner. There are many reasons for the mutual mistrust; what matters is that it is pervasive and deep. The United States should be generous in providing military and economic assistance only so long as that assistance is made conditional on how it is used. U.S. markets should be more open to Pakistani exports. But Americans must accept that there will always be clear differences between how they and most Pakistanis see the world, and sharp differences of opinion on what is to be done. Under these circumstances, U.S. foreign policy should follow a simple guide: The United States should cooperate with Pakistan where and when it can, but act independently where and when it must. The successful operation that killed Osama bin Laden in May 2011 is a case in point.
    Interest is growing in the possible contributions of diplomacy to U.S. policy. Three potential paths are receiving considerable attention. One involves the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban. There is talk of moving toward some sort of a new "shura" that would attempt to integrate the Taliban into the formal ruling structure of Afghanistan. The second path involves India and Pakistan. A third path involves neighboring and regional states, including Pakistan as well as Iran, India, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and others. This would resemble the "6 plus 2" forum that facilitated Afghan-related diplomacy in the past.
    I judge prospects for a major breakthrough on either the Afghan/Taliban or India/Pakistan front to be poor. The weak and divided Afghan government enjoys at best uneven support around the country. The Taliban are themselves divided. Pakistan has its own agenda. It is far from clear that the situation is ripe for a power-sharing accord that would meaningfully reduce, much less end, the fighting. India and Pakistan are far apart and, again, it is not clear that the leadership in either government is in a position to undertake significant negotiations involving meaningful compromise. None of this is reason not to explore these possibilities, but expectations should be kept firmly in check. Prospects might be somewhat better for reviving a regional forum, though, and this possibility should be pursued.
    I should add that I endorse talks between the United States and those Taliban leaders willing to engage. Direct communication is much preferable to either the Pakistan or Afghan government acting as an intermediary. Thus, the decision announced by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in February 2011 to drop preconditions for talking to the Taliban was a step in the right direction. The same logic holds for rejecting any Taliban preconditions. What matters in a dialogue is less where it begins than where it ends. The Taliban should understand that U.S. forces will attack them if they associate with terrorists, and that the U.S. government will only favor their participation in the political process if they forego violence. There is a chance that the Taliban might be more open to considering such commitments in the aftermath of the killing of Osama bin Laden and the inevitable surfacing of questions about Al Qaeda’s future. It might also help influence Taliban calculations to make clear that the United States will continue to provide military training and support to the Afghan central government and to local groups of its choosing.
    No one should kid himself, though: There is unlikely to be a rosy future for Afghanistan any time soon. The most likely future for the next few years and possibly beyond is some form