Free Grid of the Gods by Joseph P. Farrell, Scott D. de Hart Page B

it is necessary that he who can give God anything of his own which is more valuable than all things in the possession of God, must be greater than all else but God himself.
     
Boso: I cannot deny it.
     
Anselm: Therefore none but God can make this satisfaction.
     
Boso: So it appears.
     
Anselm: But none but a man ought to do this, other wise man does not make the satisfaction.
     
Boso: Nothing seems more just.
     
(CHAPTER VII)
     
Anselm: … For God will not do it, because he has no debt to pay; and man will not do it, because he cannot. Therefore, in order that the God-man may perform this, it is necessary that the same being should be perfect God and perfect man, in order to make this atonement.
     
    And with those statements, Anselm has reduced God, man, and Christ as cogs in a kind of “accounting” adjustment as vast cogs in an impersonal machine of justice and sacrifice. Anselm “wins” the argument, and his disciple Boso summarizes this principle in chapter eighteen of Book Two:
Boso: …And you, by numerous and positive reasons, have shown that the restoring of mankind ought not to take place, and could not, without man paid the debt which he owed God for his sin. And this debt was so great that, while none but man must solve the debt, none but God was able to do it; so that he who does it must be both God and man. And hence arises a necessity that God should take man into unity with his own person; so that he who in his own nature was bound to pay the debt, but could not, might be able to do it in the person of God.
     
    Pause and consider quite carefully what this means. On Anselm’s view, God is a banker, and Christ is less a person than an action of sacrifice balancing the books; all other aspects of the life and teaching of Christ are, really, merely superfluous to this overriding sacrificial necessity. On this view, even life itself is an indebtedness, and this reveals the flaw in Anselm’s logic, for if life itself is an indebtedness, could mankind ever sufficiently “honor God” to pay back the debt of life?
    There is, of course, a further flaw in Anselm, and it is a moral one, for it makes God the Father demand the death-by-torture of his own Son to satisfy an affront to His honor, an act that, even onhuman terms, seems neither just nor befitting a “God of Love,” and an action few, if any, human fathers would ever demand.
    We are dealing, in short, with a kind of closed “economico- theological” system, with God’s honor as the interest, and mankind the principal and collateral on it.
    With this view of mankind as a mechanism in a machine, let us now return to the Aztecs, to Teotihuacan, and look more closely at the possible physics connections.
    C. Teotihuacan
     
    Teotihuacan may rightly be said to be the Giza of the Americas. Its massive Pyramid of the Sun and Pyramid of the Moon dominate the Valley of Mexico, and their names themselves are both specifically mentioned in the local native lore, and were adopted by the Aztecs themselves when they moved into the Valley. 21 The name Teotihuacan itself means “city of the gods.” Indeed, the emperor Montezuma himself thought that the Pyramid of the Sun was the “original primeval mound marking the spot where creation had been set in motion at the beginning of the present epoch of the earth.” 22 In this, as we shall discover, the Aztecs echoed the Egyptians, who also regarded their great pyramids at Giza as representing the primeval mountains of creation.
    In other words, the pyramids of Teotihuacan and in particular the Pyramid of the Sun were regarded as somehow fundamentally connected to the cosmological processes of creation itself. For the Aztecs, as for the Egytptians, they were, in some rudimentary sense, understood to be machines manipulating the physics of the cosmological process of creation and destruction itself at the highest, topological level .
    However, for the Aztecs, unlike for the Egyptians, that manipulation was