Free Hannibal by Ernle Bradford

Tunisia.
    ‘[He] began by reminding them of their achievements in the past: though, he said, they had undertaken many hazardous enterprises and fought many a battle they had never met with ill success when they followed his plans and counsels. Next he bade them be of good heart considering that the hardest part of their task was now accomplished, since they had forced the passage of the river and had the testimony of their own ears and eyes to the friendly sentiments and readiness to help of their allies….’ It was up to him—and they knew his worth—to attend to the details. What was required of them was to obey orders and show themselves brave men. There was to be no delay. They would strike camp in the morning and begin the great march.
    The return of the Numidian horse would have been sufficient to confirm Hannibal in his haste. On their reconnaissance sortie they had run into a force of three hundred of Scipio’s cavalry, sent out on a similar mission. After a savage encounter, in which the Numidians had come off badly, they had retreated with the Romans in hot pursuit. It is worth noting that this is the only time in the long campaign that the Numidians seem to have been worsted, and one can only assume that they had come up against heavy cavalry—an arm against which they were not designed to operate. Hannibal and his great cavalry commander Maharbal were always careful to use them in the future for harassment, keeping their own heavy brigade to deal with the Roman equivalent. On this occasion the Roman cavalry was able to sweep within sight of the Carthaginian camp, calculate the number of men in it, and report back to Scipio.
    The latter, not unnaturally, thought that the presence of Hannibal’s army on the east bank of the Rhône could only mean that the Carthaginian was preparing to give battle. It could be assumed that he had known of the Roman troop movements in Italy—such things could hardly be kept secret and the doors of the temple of Janus had stood open (indicating a state of war) ever since Saguntum. Hannibal must have known that a strike against Carthage was being prepared in Sicily while he, Scipio, was on his way by sea to attack the Carthaginian empire in Spain. What would be the response of Hannibal to such a threat? To march north, cross the Ebro, bring the tribes in the area between the river and the Pyrenees under his control, and then to invade southern France so as to secure Spain against attack from the north. Scipio’s duty was clear: he must attack as soon as possible, before Hannibal was able to seduce many of the Rome-hating Gauls to his army. He set out to cover the sixty miles from his base camp with two legions (4,500 to 6,000 men apiece), some fourteen thousand allied infantry and sixteen hundred horse. After only three days’ march (no mean feat since he was covering roughly the same distance that had taken Hannibal four days) he reached the point on the Rhône where the Carthaginians had been encamped.
    It was deserted. His cavalry had not misled him, for here were all the traces of the camp, as well as local Gauls to confirm that the strange men from the south had been there only three days before. They had gone north following the banks of the great river…. There could only be one conclusion, for nothing lay to the north except further unmapped lands inhabited by savage Gauls. Hannibal must be attempting the unthinkable—to march as far as one of the Rhône’s tributary rivers that came down from the Alps, and then follow a route given him by the Gauls that would lead into Italy.
    Scipio turned his legions about and made haste back to Massilia. It is a great tribute to his coolness and foresight that he did not embark at once with all his men and return to Italy. But he had been given Spain as his sphere of operations and he realised that, whatever happened, Spain still remained the key to the whole war. With Hannibal and his army away from his home base, Roman arms