could turn malicious.
Orders to sell specific stocks such as Apple, Google, or other widely held names could
come flooding in and overwhelm the market makers and buyers. A price decline could
start out slowly and gather momentum until it turns into a full-fledged market panic.
Circuit breakers could be tripped, but the selling pressure would not abate. Business
TV channels would pick up the story, and the panic would spread.
For the enemy traders, there is no tomorrow. They are not worried about paying for
their trades in a few days or in the repercussions of mark-to-market losses. Their
capital might even be on its way back to banks in Beijing or Moscow, unbeknown to
the clearing brokers now handling the orders. Capital markets have certain safeguards
against overnight credit risk, but no effective safeguards have ever been devised
to insure against losses that arise during the course of a single day. Chinese or
Russian covert hedge funds could exploit this weakness while abusing trust and credit
built up over years.
The malicious attack need not be confined to cash markets. While the attackers are
selling stocks, they could buy put options or short the stock in a dealer swap to
add selling pressure. The malicious customer becomes like a virus infecting the dealer’s
trading desk, forcing it to add to the mayhem.
Another force multiplier is to begin the attack on a day when markets are already
crashing for unrelated reasons. Attackers could wait for a day when major stock indexes
are already down 2 percent, then launch the attack in an effort to push markets down
20 percent or more. This might produce a crash comparable to the great two-day crash
of 1929, which marked the beginning of the Great Depression.
Financial attackers can also utilize psychological operations, psyops, to increase
the attack’s effectiveness. This involves issuing false news stories and starting
rumors. Stories that a Fed chairman has been kidnapped or that a prominent financier
has suffered a heart attack would be effective. Stories that a top-tier bank has closed
its doors or that a hedge fund manager has committed suicide would suffice. These
wouldbe followed by stories that major exchanges are having “technical difficulties” and
sell orders are not being processed, leaving customers with massive losses. For verisimilitude,
stories would be crafted to mimic events that have actually happened in recent years.
Mainstream media would echo the stories, and the panic-inducing scenarios would be
widespread.
The New York Stock Exchange and the SEC claim they have safeguards designed to prevent
this kind of runaway trading. But those safeguards are designed to slow down rational
traders who are trying to make money and may be temporarily irrational. They involve
time-outs for the markets to allow traders to comprehend the situation and begin to
see bargains they might buy. They also involve margin calls designed to cover mark-to-market
losses and give the brokers a cushion against customers who default.
Those mitigation techniques do not stop the financial warrior, because he is not looking
for bargains or profits. The attacker can use the time-out to pile on additional sell
orders in a second wave of attacks. Also, these safety techniques rely heavily on
actual performance by the affected parties. When a margin call is made, it applies
the brakes to a legitimate trader due to the need to provide cash. But the malicious
trader would ignore the margin call and continue trading. For the malicious trader,
there is no day of reckoning. The fact that the enemy might be discovered later is
also no deterrent. The United States knew the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor
after
the attack, but it didn’t see the attack coming until its battleships were sunk or
in flames.
A clearing broker could close out the malicious account to prevent more trading, but
that moves the open