Free True Names and the Opening of the Cyberspace Frontier by Vernor Vinge

procedures, virtual communities typically have their own moral codes and ethical standards. Revolutionary or so-called terrorist groups are just one example; unbreakable cryptographic communications mean that the potential for coordinated activity by groups having their own moral standards is greatly increased.
    A “politically incorrect” usage of these virtual communities is to use “race bits” to bar membership by certain races in such communities. This can even be done without violating the protection of a nym, using the idea of a “credential without identity.” For example, the Aryan Cybernation could demand that a credential be displayed showing one to be a Caucasian. Ironically, an equivalent example, but one which is deemed politically correct by many, is the example of “women-only” forums on the Net. In this case, a woman could gain access to a women-only forum by demonstrating possession of a credential with the appropriate gender bit set. (At the simplest level, this can be done by having other women “vouch” for a candidate, digitally signing a statement the candidate presents.) A more robust system, with less opportunity for false use or false transfer, would be to implement Chaum’s credentials-without-identity scheme. But the point is to show how virtual communities can establish their own access rules and their own enforcement mechanisms.
    In this example, if the nexus of the virtual community is not known to be in a specific jurisdiction, but is “virtual,” enforcement of national laws is problematic. Nations can ban membership in such unapproved groups, of course, but then members will access them through remailers, etc. (Which would inevitably lead to the next step: banning remailed messages, banning encrypted messages, registering personal computers and software, etc.)
    The use of encryption by “evil” groups, such as child pornographers, terrorists, money launderers, and racists, is cited by those who wish to limit civilian access to crypto tools. I call these the “Four Horseman of the Infocalypse,” as they are so often cited as the reason why ordinary citizen-units of a nation-state are not to have access to crypto. Newspaper headlines scream “Child Pornography Ring Using Secret Codes to Communicate,” and the U.S. Department of Justice and the FBI send spokesmen out to speak at public conferences on the dangers of encryption.
    This is clearly a dangerous argument to make, for various good reasons. The basic right of free speech is the right to speak in a language one’s neighbors or governing leaders may not find comprehensible: encrypted speech.
    Many of us believe we are already seeing the imminent end of nation-states, with virtual communities attaining greater importance for many people. Certainly many of us are “closer” to our neighbors in cyberspace—those with whom we share certain interests—than we are to our physical neighbors. And the passions of these special interest groups (think of Aryan Nation, Greenpeace, Sendero Luminoso, Scientologists, etc.) are often vastly more intense than normal nationalistic sentiments. (This was the rap against the Catholic Church: that Catholics were often more loyal to the Pope and the Vatican than to their various provinces and kingdoms. Whether true or not, it has clearly been a concern for many centuries.)
    In such “discretionary” communities, the time-honored enforcement mechanism of “shunning” is gaining new popularity. Using kill files or twit filters, nobody in these communities has to read the messages of those they dislike. They can just filter them out.
    Reputations Matter
    What will keep people from reneging on digital deals? What will keep them honest? If the government and the courts cannot track a person down, because they used untraceable or anonymous systems, how will digital societies and economies work?
    Well, for