Free Raiders by Ross Kemp

Commando enterprise, the returns did not justify the huge logistical effort and the deployment of scarce resources and elite troops. (Operation CLAYMORE proved to be a more important moment in the war than it seemed at the time. A set of rotor wheels for an Enigma cypher machine and its code books were seized from the German armed trawler
Krebs
, which helped the scientists at Bletchley Park to break German naval codes.)
    Unaware of this crucial development, the top brass of the three services looked upon CLAYMORE as a waste of scarce resources. Each service had its own sound reasons for not wanting to commit to the Commando cause: the Army resented the release of some of its best officers and men, the Navy was reluctant to free warships from other more pressing tasks and the RAF was eager to concentrate on hitting targets they considered to be of greater importance. Another problem with the Commando experiment was Admiral Keyes, the director of Combined Operations, an abrasive character who clashed regularly with the Chiefs of Staff. Though a close personal friend, Churchill knew he had to replace him. His choice of successor was a bold gamble. Lord Louis Mountbatten, a cousin of the King, was well-regarded within the Royal Navy but he was only a Captain, and would be taking his seat around a table of Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals. In the event, it proved to be an inspirational move by Churchill. A character of great charm, energy and daring, Mountbatten’s arrival at Combined Operations HQ led to smoother cooperation between the three services and a significant ramping-up of operational activity.
    Encouraged by the qualified success of CLAYMORE, large-scale raids that would cause significant damage to enemy operations became the priority at COHQ. Planners pored over maps of Europe’s Western coastline from Spain to the Arctic, searching for a target that met all the criteria laid down. The target had to be a) vital to the German war effort, b) no more than a mile from the sea, c) offer good coastline for the amphibious landing of troops, d) present good intelligence of enemy numbers and defences and e) located away from areas with heavy concentrations of troops.
    One location stood out from the list: Vaagso. At first glance, a small fishing community on an open-ended fjord halfway up the Norwegian coast towards the Arctic Circle might not appear to be the most urgent objective in the middle of a world war, but Vaagso fitted the bill on all counts. As Norway’s main processing centre of fish oil, it was a vital asset. It also had the added attraction of being within reach of RAF bases in Scotland, which could give air cover to the raiding party and the naval force. The main objective of the operation was to destroy the processing factories, but to do that the force would first have to destroy the enemy’s main defences. The most important of these were four coastal gun batteries on the island of Maaloy, 500 yards from the town, guarding the mouth of the fjord. Two other coastal batteries and a torpedo station also required elimination.
    The official intention of Operation ARCHERY as stated in the planning documents was ‘to carry out a raid on military and economic objectives in the vicinity of Vaagso island with the object of harassing the coastal defences of S.W. Norway and diverting the attention of the enemy Naval and Air Forces from Operation ANKLET.’ This simultaneous operation was considered to be the more important of the two. Comprising a much larger force of twenty vessels, one Commando plus a contingent of Norwegian troops, its objective was the Lofoten Islands, 100 miles north of the Arctic Circle. The plan was for it to remain there for several weeks; it was to cut off German sea lanes, sweep the coastline, harassing convoys, and interrupt shipments of iron ore, another natural resource vital to the enemy war effort. A twin operation, it was hoped, would divide enemy resources and give each a