Free One Tribe at a Time: The Paper that Changed the War in Afghanistan by Jim Gant Page A

from them. Learn about being a Muslim. Learn about Islam. Learn about the tribe. Ideally, TETs must not onlylive with the tribe, but steadily integrate themselves into tribal life and customs (as much as the tribe allows). My experience in Mangwel would not be believed by most who did not see it firsthand.
    Targeting Taliban and al-Qaeda will be a secondary, but at times needed, task.
The Tribal Security Force (Arbakai) Would Have Three Primary Elements:
A security force responsible for the physical safety of the village/tribe members.
An intelligence collection element (kishakee).
An offensive action and reconnaissance element. This element could integrate itself with ANA or CF elements with the help of the TETs.
    The initial priority would be to quickly mobilize the TSFs. They can become an effective force in a short period of time, possibly in ninety days.
    Paying the TSF will automatically improve the financial situation of the village and create a stronger bond with the tribesmen who live there.
    Task Organization
    The following is a “shopping list” of what I, or any TET leader, would need on Day One:
3/6/12 US personnel based on environment
2 interpreters
2 SAT phones
2 SATCOM radio (piggyback freq)
2 PRC-119s
2 ATVs
2 Pick-up trucks
3 Generators
2 Computers with a biometrics kit
    Initial infill logistics package for the tribe:
100 AK-47s
30,000 to 50,000 rounds of ammunition
Assorted medical supplies
A “Gift of Honor” for the tribal chief
    One must have a true love and respect for the Afghan people (the tribes) and be willing to give a better part of his life for this strategy to work. Not everyone will be able to do this nor should they. But for those warriors who are qualified and feel the calling, it will be the adventure of a lifetime.

    Someday you too could fly an American flag outside your firebase, as we did at ours here in Asadabad.

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CLOSING THOUGHTS
    “Many so-called failed states are really failed tribes.”
    -David Ronfeldt, “Tribes—The First and Forever Form”
    We have to study and understand the tribes. Become their true friends and let them see us in all of our strengths and faults as well.
Work with Tribalism, Not Against It
    “In the absence of state institutions, how can a typical civil society’s service requirements be provided or administeredin an efficient manner? One way is to use traditional groups such as tribes who have experience in performing local governance roles and functions.” (Taylor 2005, 9)
    In the words of Haji Mohammed Zalmay, one of the better district governors in Konar Province, “The key to success is getting tribes to come to shuras and keeping them united.”
    Remember, in most cases the Taliban is not present in areas where the tribes do not want them to be.
    Whether the US “wins” or “loses” in Afghanistan, the tribes will still be there. As David Ronfeldt says in “Tribes—The First and Forever Form,” “The tribe will never lose its significance or its attractiveness; it is not going away in the centuries ahead.” Therefore, we must learn to understand the tribe’s significance
now
.
    There will be no large-scale “awakening” of the tribes in Afghanistan, as there was in al-Anbar Province in Iraq. It will be a much lower and more difficult process.
Nine Differences between Iraq and Afghanistan
    In an excellent paper by Carter Malkasian and Jerry Meyerle entitled, “How is Afghanistan different from al-Anbar?” the authors list nine differences and four implications of those differences:
Sectarianism in Iraq versus government misrule in Afghanistan
The strength of Arab tribes in al-Anbar versus Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s unique history of warlordism
The major rift in the al-Anbar insurgency versus the minor rifts in the Afghan insurgency
Arab tribal customs in Iraq versus the Pashtun tribal code (Pashtunwali) in Afghanistan
The urban al-Anbar insurgency versus the rural Afghan insurgency
The IED and suicide attacks of