Free A Just Cause by Jim; Bernard; Edgar Sieracki Page B

committee, “It’s our understanding that Valerie Jarrett will testify that she received no requests, nor did she request any quid-pro-quo relative to her possible appointment as senator.” He said that each witness would confirm that he or she was never involved in arrangements where political or public action was dependent on financial support. It was his understanding that the US attorney was opposed to subpoenaing the witnesses, he said. He claimed that the requested witnesses would contradict what US Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald alleged in the criminal complaint and at the press conference he held immediately after the arrest. Predictably, Currie refused. She responded that the investigative committee did not want to jeopardize the US attorney’s “opportunity to pursue the criminal investigation that is underway against [Genson’s] client.” Genson deemed the remarks by Fitzgerald inappropriate (737–38). 28
    Genson attempted to define the debate within the confines of courtroom standards. Throughout the previous two weeks of hearings the wily defense attorney referred continually to Barbara Currie as “Your Honor.” There was a method to his misstatements; he was subliminally suggesting that the legislative hearing was governed by courtroom decorum. His aim was to establish a legal standard for impeachment and that the criteria required burden of proof. He told the committee that he looked to other states that, like Illinois, did not have constitutional standards, “to other law,” and argued that there was a “general understanding” that the standard for impeachment was “a functional equivalent of high crimes and misdemeanors” (745). The only governor to be impeached in the last seventy-four years had been Arizona governor Evan Mecham in 1988, and he was not impeached until after he was indicted. Genson argued that impeachment must be based on egregious criminal conduct and dismissed any other cause.
    Speaking from notes but mostly extemporaneously, the trial lawyer moved rapidly from one topic to another. He reminded the committee that “freedom is threatened when one branch of government is able to control or ignore the independence of another branch,” and speaking of those elected to office, he noted that “the suitability of their performance is entrusted to the determination of the electorate” (752). Genson urged the committee to look to the impeachment investigation of Justice Heiple. “The best document that exists that shows what impeachment should be in the state of Illinois is the House of Representatives impeachment opinionof Justice Heiple,” he claimed. The investigative committee report in the Heiple case “suggested to the whole House not to do it,” and Genson recommended that the report be required reading for the entire Blagojevich investigative committee (748).
    He contrasted the Heiple hearings with his present situation. Heiple was permitted counsel and informed of the allegations being investigated, but Genson received information “mostly on the day I was presented with it.” Heiple’s counsel was able to cross-examine witnesses and was given subpoena power. That remark caused Chairwomen Currie to interrupt, and she informed Genson that the rules of the investigative committee were identical to those followed in the Heiple hearings. Heiple’s counsel also had been limited to clarification and not allowed cross-examination. Undeterred by Currie’s correction, Genson continued to contrast the Heiple case with what was being allowed for Blagojevich. The Heiple hearings had begun with testimony from constitutional experts, who presented criteria for standards of impeachment and the burden of proof. The committee investigating Judge Heiple concluded that they must render their decision based on “clear and convincing evidence” (749–53).
    Genson’s defense focused