Free Battle Story by Chris Brown

withdrawing troops. An outer perimeter was also set up in and around Johore Bahru to ensure the security of the north end of the causeway and, hopefully, to gather stragglers heading away from the battle to the supposed relative safety of Singapore. In one of the few examples of a successful operation by Malaya Command, most of the troops in Johore were able to make their way to the causeway without being snarled up in traffic jams – no mean feat given the largenumbers of men and vehicles involved, and the fact that so many had become detached from their units. By good fortune – and because the exhausted Japanese were in no condition to follow up as quickly as the Allies could retreat – the operation was completed by about 0600hrs on the 31st and the outer ring of the perimeter, consisting of 22nd Australian Brigade and the Gordon Highlanders, was able to withdraw through a final defensive line around the causeway held by the Argylls, now reduced to less than 300 all ranks. Shortly after 0800hrs the Argylls were played across by their last two pipers and the causeway was blown as soon as the last man had crossed over to Singapore.

    34. Japanese infantry storm into Johore Bahru.
    Planning for the defence of Singapore followed the same general pattern as the policy that had already failed in Malaya. In an effort to provide some strength everywhere, the troops were spread thinly all around the island. Singapore was divided into three coastal sectors and a reserve area.
    The Western Area Command under General Bennett extended from a point just west of the mouth of Sungei Jurong on the south coast to a point half a mile east of the causeway then due south from there to Bukit Timah. Bennett’s command includedhis own 8th Division, including three field artillery regiments, three anti-tank regiments and nearly 2,000 newly arrived reinforcements from Australia. The latter had only been in Singapore for a little over a week and were far from being battle ready. The same applied to 44th Indian Brigade, now assigned to Bennett’s command. They had arrived on 22 January, only partially trained, unaccustomed to the climate and less than fully fit after a lengthy voyage.

    Singapore Island dispositions, February 1942.
    Heath’s III Corps took responsibility for the Northern Area with the addition of the British 18th Division, most of which had only arrived on 29 December and without most of their vehicles, equipment and ammunition, which had been lost in a ship sunk by the Japanese. Southern Area, stretching eastwards along the coast from Sungei Jurong to a point 5 miles west of Changi at the eastern tip of the island, was entrusted to Major General Keith Simmons with a force made up of 1st and 2nd Malaya Brigadesand Straits Settlements Volunteers. The 12th and 15th Indian Brigades were held as the command reserve in the Reserve Area, which stretched from Bukit Timah to Paya Lebar and included the vital Pierce and MacRitchie reservoirs.
    The general state of confusion and disintegrating morale prevented any concerted effort to organise defences properly. It was now virtually impossible to find civilian labour at any price and most fortifications were being constructed by the troops who would be fighting in them. The work was hard, but not always effective since much of the terrain was not suitable for trenches and a lot of the positions that were erected consisted of breastworks with barbed wire, when it could be made available. Breastworks, if well made, can be effective against small arms fire but are of limited value against artillery and bombing, and are often vulnerable to attacks in the flanks or the rear. Much of the work that did continue had to be conducted at night, as did any major troop movements, for fear of Japanese air attacks; a great deal of the northern part of the island was now under direct observation from high ground and tall buildings in Johore, including the sultan’s palace.
    Air raids had diminished for