Free Seize the Moment by Richard Nixon Page A

union, such as electrical power grids and natural gas pipelines, will require some kind of mechanism until the republics get on their own feet economically. The new leaders will rule neither a federation nor a confederation but rather will oversee a loose economic commonwealth. The center will coordinate, not govern, the actions of republics. While it may control defense and foreign policies initially, the republics will take over even these tasks as they acquire the necessary capabilities. As they do so, the Soviet Union will complete an evolution from an evil empire to a voluntary commonwealth of free and equal nations.
    Another potential course of events leads toward a more troubling destination: the eventual rise of a new imperial center based not on communism but on Russian nationalism. History offers few examples of one-round victories even for causes as noble as the August 1991 revolution. The situation in the Soviet Union is unstable and the ultimate outcome unpredictable. The Soviet scene is strewn with political tinder that could ignite into a conflagration. A Russian imperial tradition stretching back four centuries, a cadre of more than 15 million defrocked but unrepentant hard-line Communist bureaucrats still in positions of power, a Russian republicdominant in resources and military might, a national mosaic that scattered tens of millions of ethnic minorities in the newly independent and often highly nationalistic republics, a people increasingly desperate as the economy plunges into a deep depression—all these could spawn a variety of deadly scenarios. While these threats appear distant as we savor the victory over communism, the difficulties in achieving economic recovery could bring them closer.
    The initial steps taken by Gorbachev and Yeltsin in the aftermath of the coup have directed events along the path toward some kind of commonwealth. The replacement of the Communist-dominated Congress of People’s Deputies with a new republic-appointed interim Supreme Soviet and Moscow’s acceptance of all republic declarations of independence and sovereignty in September 1991, including freeing the Baltic states after fifty-one years of Soviet domination, laid the cornerstone of the new order. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States on January 1, 1992, established this new framework. Moreover, as long as Yeltsin remains committed to establishing democracy in Russia and the legendary capacity of the Russian people to endure difficult times is not exhausted, the temptations inherent in the Russian imperial tradition or other forms of political extremism will be kept in check.
    But the current situation is replete with potential dangers. Leaders other than Yeltsin might tap into a vein of political radicalism at some point. The people might not continue to support moderates such as Yeltsin if economic conditions fail to turn around in the near future. Four other factors could also turn events down a darker path:
    â€”A dangerous logic supports an eventual alliance between the remnants of the Communist party and extreme Russiannationalists. Because both suffered severe reverses after the August 1991 revolution—the dissolution of the party and the breakup of the traditional Russian empire—they are natural allies against the new noncommunist leaders. An obvious strategy would be to portray the democrats as leaders who “stabbed Russia in the back” and to seek a resurrection of the center’s power as a means to restore Great Russia and to provide a new mission for the country.
    â€”In addition to their overwhelming support for democracy, the Soviet people harbor a traditional desire for order imposed from above. This impulse continues to insinuate itself into popular thought even today. Opinion polls indicated many Soviet citizens had disdain for Gorbachev’s inability and unwillingness to govern with what they called “the