Free The Brave: Param Vir Chakra Stories by Rachna Bisht Rawat

giving the Indian brigade’s account in the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Congo.



THE INDO-CHINESE WAR OF 1962
     

T he blunder committed by political as well as military leadership by misreading the Chinese game and neglecting the Indian Army’s preparedness, made India suffer a humiliating defeat in the Sino-Indian war. The only thing that stood out was the iron will and cold courage of the soldiers who, though completely outnumbered and ill-equipped, fought to defend their country’s honour.
    The seeds of the war were sown in the Aksai Chin area which India considered a part of Kashmir but China considered a part of Xinjiang. Tension was compounded further after the Tibetan uprising of1959, when India granted asylum to the Dalai Lama. This led to unpleasantness with China and some violent incidents on the border.
    India then started sending patrols into disputed areas with China. The aim was to create outposts behind the advancing Chinese Army so that their supplies could be cut off. India initiated a Forward Policy in which it placed outposts along the border. These included some posts which were placed north of the McMohan Line, the eastern part of the Line of Actual Control.
    Initially, the plan seemed to work but later China took this as a threat and decided to teach India a lesson. A romantic and politically shortsighted Nehru however did not increase military spending on preparation for a possible war with China. Not only was the Army denied equipment, the renowned 4 th Infantry Division was used to build houses instead of preparing for war.
    Nehru appointed Lt General B. M. Kaul as Chief of Army Staff in 1961. General Kaul was confident that China would not retaliate when India sent patrols into areas disputed with China. The Chinese, however, slowly started encircling the Indian positions.
    Maj Dhan Singh Thapa’s post at Sirijap in Ladakh was one such case. In fact, such was the confidence that China would not attack that he had even been granted leave to go home just a few days before the Chinese attacked Sirijap.
    Major Thapa was waiting for his reliever when the Chinese attacked, massacring nearly the entire company and taking the survivors back as Prisoners of War. Maj Thapa, awarded a Param Vir Chakra posthumously since he was believed dead, was one of these POWs.
    As early as August, China had started accumulating arms, ammunition and rations and the signs were clear that they were preparing for war. India, however, turned a blind eye to all this. Subedar Joginder Singh, awarded a Param Vir Chakra posthumously, waited across a stream in the Bumla axis in Arunachal Pradesh, then called the North-East Frontier Agency, watching the Chinese prepare their defences.
    Indian forces were unprepared, ill-equipped and did not even have proper winter clothing when on 12 October Jawaharlal Nehru declared that he had ordered the Indian Army to throw the Chinese out of NEFA. On 14 October, an editorial in the
People’s Daily
in China issued a warning to India and Nehru, ‘At this critical moment, we still want to appeal once more to Mr Nehru: better rein in at the edge of the precipice and do not use the lives of Indian troops as stakes in your gamble,’ it said. On 20 October, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army launched two attacks on India. One of these was in Thag La, NEFA, while the other was in the Chushul sector of Ladakh. Both the attacks were massive in terms of troop concentration. On the Indian side, single companies of around 120 soldiers defended posts that were surrounded by thousands of enemy soldiers armed with machine guns, mortars and grenades. The Battle of Rezang La, where almost every man died fighting and Major Shaitan Singh got his Param Vir Chakra posthumously, is still remembered as a tale of tragic heroism where brave soldiers unquestioningly gave up their lives for the mistakes of shaky government heads and bad military leaders.
    The Sino-Indian War was fought at altitudes