Free Circle of Treason by Sandra V. Grimes Page A

and unassuming way.
    Earlier in his career Paul managed to avoid scrutiny by the Black Hats in the division by packing up his expanding family and accepting overseas assignments far from their crosshairs. Luckily for him, by the time he returned to headquarters in about 1971, division management had regained a modicum of control over its operational and personnel assignments from Angleton. Paul was given a supervisory position in the Counterintelligence Group, where he remained until his selection as Polyakov’s new field confidant in 1974.
    Vowing to assemble the best field team possible, division management did not stop with Paul. Diana Worthen, who later played an instrumental role in the Ames investigation, was tapped to be the Soviet analyst for our office in New Delhi, with primary responsibility for Paul and Polyakov, or as analysts often described their function, “the care and feeding of those I support.”
    A graduate of the University of New Mexico, Worthen joined the Agency in November 1970 as a secretary-stenographer. After several assignments, including an overseas tour, she returned to headquarters and a secretarial position in the counterintelligence component, where she was converted to professional status as an analyst and discovered her calling in Soviet operations. Worthen was a no-nonsense officer who set high standards for herself and expected the same from others, on occasion advising them of their shortcomings. Conversely, she was a private person whose devotion to her job and to her carefully selected friends was paramount in her life. Little did she know before leaving for New Delhi that her commitment to Polyakov would later collide with a valued friendship, when Ames betrayed both in 1985.
    The final member of the triumvirate was the prototypical DO operations officer whose command of the Russian language and knowledge ofthe Soviet system was legendary. We will call him “Mr. K.” He traveled as an ordinary American businessman and his occasional presence at debriefing sessions demonstrated to Polyakov the importance we attached to him and his work on our behalf. To add a layer of security to the contact, Polyakov reported his contact with an “American businessman” target to GRU headquarters, with a fictional description of their nature and content. This earned him points with his unsuspecting management for his supposed work against the Main Enemy.
    Paul D and Polyakov were the perfect match. The GRU General came to understand that he had a trustworthy co-conspirator in Paul and it was time to discard his belief that he was merely an agent whose only value was the information he provided. Polyakov was also a human being for whom we had assumed a personal responsibility when he volunteered his services. Under these circumstances, Polyakov found sanctuary in his meetings with Paul and not unexpectedly began to provide glimpses into his rationale for volunteering to American intelligence. It would be inaccurate to characterize his comments on motivation as an emotional catharsis. Polyakov was and remained a circumspect individual whose character and military training never would have permitted such a display. Nevertheless, his specific comments on and oblique references to the subject provided a framework from which we could further extrapolate with some certainty.
    Polyakov’s motivation probably went back to his service and experiences during World War II. As an artillery officer in the Soviet Army who was awarded decorations for bravery, Polyakov witnessed the courage and sacrifice of the Russian soldier despite unbearable conditions and unspeakable horrors. After the war he attended the Frunze Military Academy, from which he was recruited by the GRU. It is believed that sometime during this period Polyakov began to view the Soviet leaders as corrupt thugs who subjugated the common man for personal power and to line their pockets and those of their sycophants. To