Free Circle of Treason by Sandra V. Grimes Page B

him these select few were mocking the sacrifices of the Russian people and he only saw a future of continued corruption and thirst for power expanding throughout the world. The Russian people were slaves of their leaders, helpless and alone in the world. Of equal significance, the Western world in general and the United States in particular were not a counterbalance to Soviet power. As viewed by Polyakov, our military was weak, our leaders lacked fortitude and, of greater consequence, were bound by civilizedrules of behavior. His were bound by none and Polyakov concluded that the Soviet Union would win the Cold War.
    In early 1968 during a meeting in Rangoon, Polyakov lectured Al K on the cowardice of the commander of the USS Pueblo who allowed North Korean gunboats to capture his vessel without firing a shot. In a paraphrase of Polyakov’s words, a Soviet naval commander would have fought to the death before surrendering his ship to the enemy. However long the process or the twists and turns in his reasoning, Polyakov eventually came to view himself as an individual who just might be able to make a difference in the struggle between East and West. At a minimum he could level the playing field or, in a best-case scenario, tilt it in favor of the United States. Events such as the Pueblo only strengthened his position that without his assistance we were doomed to live under the hammer and sickle of Soviet domination.
    On a more practical level, Polyakov wanted to guarantee a future for his sons in the Soviet system, but to accomplish this he had to curry favor from the powerful within his organization. The Americans were the means by which he could succeed in this ambition, providing him with gifts that allowed him to buy influence. As he rose within the GRU organization, doors opened for his sons and they were afforded the benefits of higher education and employment opportunities commensurate with their father’s rank and position.
    Polyakov never championed our causes of freedom, justice, and democracy. Quite the contrary; these were lofty ideals that did not matter to him and his daily life. On the few occasions when we raised the possibility of defection to the West, he quietly but forcefully ended the conversation. Polyakov was born a Russian and would die a Russian.
    Christmas came early and often for everyone involved in the Polyakov operation during the New Delhi phase, and we waited anxiously for the highlights cable from Paul D after each meeting. What was Polyakov sending us this time? Over the years we had come to expect everything on GRU operations and personnel to which he had access, but it was his positive intelligence that had consumers in the U.S. government talking. Was it the “secret” version of Military Thought , a monthly publication of the Soviet general staff on military doctrine and strategy? While dry prose to many of us in operations, analysts throughout the intelligence community found it invaluable to understanding the Soviet militarythreat and came to expect the monthly disseminations as if they were a subscription to a favorite magazine. Was it the top secret Soviet embassy annual report that was a comprehensive statement of Soviet embassy relations with its host country and included contributions from the GRU and KGB chiefs? Was it the famous “Top Secret of Special Importance” Kapitsa document detailed earlier in Chapter 4 ? Was it the hundreds of pages of the top secret Military Industrial Commission’s collection requirements on Western military technology, staggering in their reflection of Soviet knowledge of highly classified U.S. military plans and programs, and a bombshell according to many in the intelligence community? (The Military Industrial Commission [VPK] of the USSR Council of Ministers coordinated and controlled all research, design, development, testing, and production of Soviet military equipment and systems. An integral part of the VPK’s