Free Front Burner by Kirk S. Lippold

the time, the ship could use force to defend itself only if it was attacked, shot at, or overtly threatened with weapons or met with other clear demonstrations of hostile intent. Supplementary measures could authorize more aggressive defenses, but for USS Cole , none were authorized in Aden. We were not provided with specific intelligence about the terrorist threat, though Central Command had classed the general level as High—that is, below Critical, the highest level, but above Medium, Low, and Negligible. Indeed, there was some confusion even about this, as we had been also told about a new four-point system that put Yemen’s threat level at Significant, the second highest on a scale that began with High and continued through Moderate to Low.
    The weapons officer, Lieutenant Joe Gagliano, who also had the collateral duty (that is, the part-time job) of force protection officer, worked
with the strike officer, Lieutenant (junior grade) Robert Mercer, his force protection assistant, to draw up the force protection plan based on the most recent information we had about the port facilities in Aden. Since we had no confirmation of where we would actually be berthed and refueled, it was written for a worst-case, highest restriction scenario: a pierside mooring accessible to vehicles and foot traffic. It consisted of all sixty-two measures required in port for Threat Conditions Alpha and Bravo. We assumed that after arriving, we would adjust the security posture to fit whatever our actual circumstances turned out to be. With the delay in reporting to Central Command, the plan was submitted on October 7 to Commander, Task Force 50, the Abraham Lincoln battle group we would be serving with after the refueling, and was quickly approved without modification or comment, with no deviations authorized.
    On October 8, USS Cole sent a standard unclassified message to the U.S. embassy’s defense attaché’s office (DAO) in Sana’a, requesting logistics support for the short duration of the refueling: a pilot and tugs to assist in entering the port and mooring the ship to the refueling pier; a hookup to provide drinking water for the crew; a connection to pump sewage off the ship to a shore-based waste facility; fuel delivery; and a request for details of any specific security arrangements needed. The supply requests were noted and referred to a local contractor to arrange with us upon arrival. There was nothing in response to the request for information about security arrangements.
    In hindsight, it may seem obvious that I should have asked for more information before arrival, but it had been standard operating procedure by the Navy for decades to accept a lack of information and still make a port visit. Usually, upon arrival, the lists of unknowns would be answered by the port authorities without incident or issue. Rarely, if ever, were all the requests for information answered by the embassy prior to arrival. Such gaps in information were an accepted way of doing business overseas, even in a port in the Middle East operating under Threat Condition Bravo.
    On October 11, the defense attaché’s office acknowledged our request for logistics support and instructed the ship to coordinate services with
the local contractor upon arrival. A lot of other important information was missing: at which pier the ship would moor; the number of tugs that would berth the ship; how and when the local contractor would board the ship to confirm fueling and other arrangements; on which side the ship could expect to moor; and the local security arrangements that would be provided by the Yemeni port authorities. Nor were official Navy channels much more helpful. Naval Forces Central Command, in the person of Vice Admiral Charles W. “Willie” Moore Jr., who was also the Fifth Fleet commander, had mandated through his staff that no information regarding any aspect of operations was allowed out of theater without their express