Free Losing Vietnam by Ira A. Hunt Jr. Page A

the JGS to look into the matter. Its findings were fascinating. According to reports from the field, medical procedures and treatment had not changed during the period. However, the territorials in MR-4 had lost so many M-16s to the enemy that the enemy was using these weapons against them. According to the ARVN, the lethality of the M-16 was so much greater than that of the AK-47 that the wounded were succumbing in greater numbers.
    The topography and the climate varied appreciably for each military region, greatly affecting military operations. Two major seasons characterized the climate: the southwest monsoon (wet season), which occurs generally from May through October, and the northeast monsoon (dry season), which usually runs from November through April. A major exception is the weather in the North Vietnamese panhandle south through MR-1 and -2 during November, December, and January, which are wet because of heavy coastal precipitation associated with the active tropical storm season. Figure 2 highlights the dry season for Southeast Asia. All values are the mean monthly precipitation for the larger areas, and the precipitation values for specific locations can vary considerably from the mean. This provides insight to the tempo of combat operations; for example, it suggests why communist attacks in MR-3 were often initiated in December, whereas in MR-1 and MR-2 they usually did not commence until February or March.
    As additional data became available, particularly with respect to the times of day when attacks were initiated, the JGS could obtain a much better understanding of communist tactics and the RVNAF responses. Since the enemy regional commanders had relative autonomy concerning day-to-day operations, the spectrum of the times enemy ground attacks were initiated against separate South Vietnamese military regions varied greatly. They peaked in MR-1 and -2 at 0600 hours, in MR-3 at 0100 and 0200 hours, and in MR-4 at 1900 hours. Although there were definite peaks in each MR, overall the enemy initiated contacts equally over a twenty-four-hour period; thus, almost half of the attacks came at night.

    Figure 2. Dry-Season Analysis. (Source: Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.)

    Figure 3. Time of Day of Friendly KHA Due to Enemy-Initiated Contacts. (Source: “Republic of Vietnam Ammunition Conservation Study,” June 1975, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.)
    Considering the friendly casualties resulting from the enemy-initiated contacts, one might expect the time spectrum of casualties to mirror the enemy attacks. However, while there were spikes at 0200 hours and between 0600 and 0800, this did not hold true for the early evening hours, even though that was the period of maximum enemy contacts. The RVNAF was most vulnerable to both enemy ground attacks and attacks by fire between 0600 and 0800 hours; it just had a difficult time getting started in the morning (see figure 3 ). The enemy attacks by fire were mostly in the daytime, the opposite of my 1968–1969 experiences.
RVNAF-Initiated Operations
    The South Vietnamese initiated operations predominantly in the daytime. When informed, the JGS, recognizing the importance of night initiatives, brought this matter to the military region commanders’ attention. Between 16 December 1973 and 14 June 1974, the ARVN initiated about 1,620 contacts between 2200 hours and 0600 hours. However, between 15 June and 14 December 1974, it conducted about 5,280 friendly-initiated night contacts, over three times as many operations. A big improvement. The results of the friendly night initiatives, however, were poorer than those of daytime forays. Unfortunately, the ARVN did not have the night vision devices that enabled the U.S. forces in South Vietnam to be so successful with nighttime operations.
    The JGS’s prodding of commanders had some immediate effects with respect to aggressiveness. The RVNAF continued to expand its operational