Free Losing Vietnam by Ira A. Hunt Jr.

41 percent of all attacks by fire—amounted to 3.1. Almost 27 percent of all RVNAF casualties during the period since the cease-fire were caused by attacks by fire. This alarming statistic conveyed a lack of troop discipline; it suggested, for example, troops congregating in the mess line without taking adequate protective measures. Multiple casualties also resulted from booby trap incidents; the 4.0 booby trap casualties per casualty-producing incident indicated bunching (walking too close together) on operations.
    RF/PF Comparisons
. Reporting data by components allowed them to be compared. Obviously, the better-trained and -equipped ARVN outperformed the territorials—that was to be expected. However, our analysis indicated the territorials in MR-4 were definitely not performing well; not only were they not aggressive, but they performed poorly when in contact. The popular force had more troops killed than the enemy, and both the regional and popular force lost two weapons for every soldier killed in battle—a sorry state of affairs. The territorials were very important to MR-4’s defense, since there were five times as many of them (206,000) as ARVN troops (40,000). To undertake actions to remedy the situation, when provided this data the JGS directed a study to determine why the territorials’ performance in this region was lacking.
    This second presentation of combat analysis highlighted several new situations resulting from the broadened data-collection requirements. It also verified that the RVNAF was becoming more aggressive, taking the battle to the enemy, and that when it took the initiative it was more efficient and effective. That attacks by fire caused 27 percentof all casualties was disturbing. Also upsetting were the multiple casualties resulting from booby trap incidents. Obviously, both of these areas required command attention. But most important was that the combat performance of each of the army components was available. In this case, it highlighted the poor performance of the territorials in MR-4. Since these units provided the preponderance of forces in the rich delta region, the disparity required immediate remedial action.
    The analysis of the 2 December 1973–15 June 1974 period further highlighted the serious situation with the territorial forces in MR-4. Table 6 breaks out the friendly weapons lost per friendly killed by hostile action; note that the RF/PF in MR-4 lost more than two weapons per friendly killed, bringing the total average to greater than one weapon per friendly killed. The disparity between the ARVN and the territorials is obvious—except in MR-1, where the ARVN was having a difficult time. This alerted us to potential problems in MR-1, which manifested themselves later in the year. The same is true for operational initiatives or aggressiveness, particularly in MR-4, where the popular forces initiated only one contact out of thirty. This does not include attacks by fire. The overall efficiency of the ARVN in this period was 6.91, compared with 3.30 for the regional forces and 1.38 for the popular forces. Again, the popular forces in MR-4 had more friendly than enemy killed (.93), while the ARVN had an order of magnitude greater success (9.84).
    Table 6. Friendly Weapons Ratio, Weapons Lost, Friendly Killed/Total Contacts (period 3, 16 December 1973–14 June 1974)

    Source
: Analysis, “Summary of Ceasefire Statistics,” June 1975, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanon, Thailand.
    Now that our attention was focused on the poor performance of the territorials in MR-4, we noticed in late 1974 that there was a large increase in the number of those killed compared to the numberwounded; the ratio of killed to total casualties increased from 24 percent in period 3 to 32 percent in period 4. This could be an indication that medical evacuation had been curtailed or that medical treatment was lacking, either of which could seriously affect morale. I asked