Free The Spy Net by Henry Landau

established facts which could not be altered.
    To Lambrecht also belongs the credit that he helped to devise these means of controlling troop movements. Train-watching posts had never been used in any previous war, and it was the initial reports of such pioneers as Lambrecht which enabled intelligence officers at British GHQ to work out from the number of constituted units passing by a given train-watching post, their accurate system of gauging the exact volume of a troop movement.
    The mass of information transmitted by Lambrecht to British GHQ is astonishing.
    In May 1915, for example, his train-watching posts at Jemelle and Namur rapidly and accurately reported the transfer of several German divisions from the Serbian Front to Flanders. This was of vast importance because it was an indication that all the German divisions on the Serbian Front were being transferred to France. In August 1915, his posts noted a heavy movement of troops from the Eastern Front to Champagne. This concentration of troops was intended to parry the offensive which the Germans knew the French were preparing in this sector. As a result of this information, the French advanced the date of their offensive several days.
    Lambrecht also accurately reported the German preparations for their attack on Verdun. Much of the information he obtained through the indiscretions of a German major, billeted in his sister’s home. But not satisfied with this, he sent agents into occupied France to determine the destination of the troops which were pouring past his train-watching posts in a westerly direction.
    The following letter from Afchain, dated 26 January 1916, speaks eloquently for the valuable services rendered by Lambrecht and of the high hopes entertained of him:
    I have just received a telegram of congratulations from our chief at British GHQ. The 26th Division, which you reported passing through Jemelle, on 15 December, coming from the Eastern Front, has been contacted in the front line.
    Do your best to establish train-watching posts in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and in occupied France. I know how difficult this will be; but the merit will be all the greater, if you are successful. Knowing your great tenacity, I am sure if anyone can succeed, you will .
    Events now began to move quickly.
    Eighteen months of experience had taught the German counter-espionage service all the tricks used by refugees, and by the Allied secret services, and efficient means had been devised to seal the Belgian–Dutch frontier. In the interior, every Belgian, man and woman, was forced to carry an identity card, with photograph, name, and address attached; and special permission had to be obtained to travel from one town to another. At the frontier, a high-voltage electric wire, a cordon of sentries every100 yards, mounted patrols, police dogs, and, finally, an army of plain-clothes Secret Police, guarded its entire length.
    The Belgian refugees in Holland who had dabbled in secret service could well shut up shop. And it was a good riddance – they had exploited the patriotism of their countrymen in the interior, and they had sold their information to the highest bidder among the Allied secret services, sometimes to several of them at the same time. The results cost the life of many a brave man or woman in the occupied territories.
    But the secret service game had become a problem even to the official services. After months of fruitless effort many of their representatives were recalled from Holland, to leave the field clear for the few who still seemed to have the chance of success. There was a period in 1916 when no information of any kind was coming out of the occupied territory. The Allied secret services had lost their initiative. New methods had to be devised to penetrate the formidable barrier which the Germans had built up at the Belgian–Dutch border.
    It was not surprising, then, that Lambrecht found himself suddenly cut off from all communication with Holland.