Free DemocracyThe God That Failed by Hans-Hermann Hoppe Page B

monarchical ruler, then, foreign policy is in large measure family and marriage policy, and territorial expansion typically proceeds via the contractual conjunction of originally independent kingdoms. 24
    Chronicles (November 1993); also Nathan Rosenberg and Luther E. Birdzell, How the West Grew Rich (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
    24 As a prominent example of this type of foreign policy, the case of the Habsburgs of Austria may be cited, whose conduct has been characterized by the motto "bella geruntalii; tujelix Austria, nubes." Maximilian I (1493-1519)
    married the heiress of the dukes of Burgundy, who, over the past century, had acquired a number of provinces in the western extremities of the [Holy Roman] Empire—the Netherlands and the Free County of Burgundy, which bordered upon France. Maximilian by this marriage had a son Philip, whom he married to Joanna, heiress to Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain. Philip and Joanna produced a son Charles. Charles combined the inheritances of his four grandparents: Austria from Maximilian, the Netherlands and Free County from Mary of Burgundy, Castile and Spanish America from Isabella, Aragon and its Mediterranean and Italian possessions from Ferdinand. In addition, in 1519, he was elected Holy Roman Emperor and so became the symbolic head of all Germany. (Robert R. Palmer and Joel Colton, A History of the Modern World [New York: Alfred Knopf, 1992], p. 74)
    On the limited and moderate character of monarchical wars see the discussion on democratic warfare below.

    In contrast to the internal and external moderation of a monarchy, a democratic (publicly owned) government implies increased excess, and the transition from a world of kings to one of democratically-elected presidents must be expected to lead to a systematic increase in the intensity and extension of government power and a significantly strengthened tendency toward decivilization.
    A democratic ruler can use the government apparatus to his personal advantage, but he does not own it. He cannot sell government resources and privately pocket the receipts from such sales, nor can he pass government possessions on to his personal heir. He owns the cur rent use of government resources, but not their capital value. In distinct contrast to a king, a president will want to maximize not total government wealth (capital values and current income) but current income (regardless and at the expense of capital values). Indeed, even if he wished to act differently, he could not, for as public property, government resources are unsaleable, and without market prices economic calculation is impossible. Accordingly, it must be regarded as unavoidable that public-government ownership results in continual capital consumption. Instead of maintaining or even enhancing the value of the government estate, as a king would do, a president (the government's temporary caretaker or trustee) will use up as much of the government resources as quickly as possible, for what he does not consume now, he may never be able to consume. In particular, a president (as distinct from a king) has no interest in not ruining his country. For why would he not want to increase his confiscations if the advantage of a policy of moderation—the resulting higher capital value of the government estate—cannot be reaped privately, while the advantage of the opposite policy of higher taxes—a higher current income— can be so reaped? For a president, unlike for a king, moderation offers only disadvantages. 25
    25 On the nature of public ownership and its inherent irrationality see also Rothbard, Power and Market, pp. 172-84; Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, chap. 9.
    The fundamental difference between private ownership of government (and low time preference) and public ownership of government (and high time preference) may be further illustrated by considering the institution of slavery, and contrasting the case of private slave ownership, as it existed for