Free A History of China by Morris Rossabi

(
li
), which could include and did resemble chivalry. Eventually they coalesced into a real hierarchy composed of dukes (
gong
), marquises (
hou
), earls (
bo
), barons (
zi
), and vice-barons (
nan
). However, these vassals did not receive their titles in perpetuity. Unlike in the European feudal system, their sons did not automatically inherit their positions. Each successive inheritor of a fief needed the court’s sanction and required the king’s blessing and enfeoffment. Such investitures entailed a personal visit to the king’s court for the enfeoffment ceremonies. In other areas, family and kinship played a much more significant role in the Zhou than in medieval Europe. Kinship ties frequently superseded contractual obligations in the enfeoffment of vassals and in the lord–vassal relationship. Since family considerations were vital in Chinese culture, it seems natural that kinship would, on occasion, supplant merit in the court’s selection of officials – still another deviation from the European model of feudalism.
    Despite such kinship ties, vassals often went their own ways within their local domains, partly because they controlled their own military forces. Warfare was, in theory, a gentleman’s activity throughout the Western Zhou and until the Warring States period and thus had well-defined rules of conduct. The chariot, though unwieldy and often a liability in uneven or rutted terrain, was characteristic of gentlemanly or aristocratic warfare. It did not provide a haven for combatants, judging from the numerous aristocrats killed while riding in such a vehicle. Scholars have repeatedly challenged its efficiency in battle, but it offered mobility for the commander, who could use it to survey the entire battlefield; it also enabled him to transport his troops from one location to another rapidly. Though its role in warfare was limited, it had symbolic value as a means to impress allies and enemies. It had prestige but was infrequently decisive in battles. As the dynasty wore on, the infantry became increasingly significant, and wars were fought on a grander scale. Archery, as well as hand-to-hand combat, became important, and the larger scope of war necessitated more sophisticated analyses of strategy.
    A military handbook could be useful in fulfilling this need. Other handbooks probably preceded it, but the
Ping fa
(
Art of War
), probably written in the fourth century BCE by Sunzi, offered such guidance. The Zhou vassals used this handbook as a guidebook for fending off enemies and ensuring authority in their domains. Although it dealt with battle tactics and strategy, it also emphasized supposed auxiliary aspects of warfare such as espionage and intelligence information, support from the populace, and cleverness in deploying troops rather than simply focusing on manpower and weaponry. The writer asserted that the best commanders would gain their objectives without a ­battle, an example of so-called soft power. Military historians often refer to it as one of the first descriptions of guerilla warfare.
    The
Zhanguoce
(
Intrigues of the Warring States
), another contemporary text, also reflected the difficult times. The work offered a guide to proper diplomacy for the often hostile states in this period and provided means of avoiding ­conflict. Pointing to reportedly real historical events, the work inculcated a set of diplomatic principles that could be used in averting catastrophic wars against other states.
    Meanwhile, raids by non-Chinese peoples along the country’s frontiers, together with the increasing disaffection of its vassals, contributed to the growing decentralization of the Western Zhou. Natural catastrophes, including a serious earthquake in the reign of the last king, added to its troubles. The dynasty was increasingly vulnerable, and it should come as no surprise that foreign forces – so-called barbarians – raided the capital in 771 BCE , killing the king and compelling the