Free Red Hammer 1994 by Robert Ratcliffe Page B

the past had they daydreamed about delivering a knockout nuclear blow to their implacable enemies?
    “We assumed that after approximately two to three minutes, the Americans will have picked up our boosters with their DSP early warning satellite system. By five to six minutes, the warning will have been passed to Strategic Command headquarters in Omaha and to Washington. Remember, though, the attack will have come out of nowhere. It will command an uncanny presence of mind to correctly decipher the data. Given the possibility for computer error or sensor malfunction, all which will have to be checked out, the Americans may lose two to three additional minutes.
    “By ten to fifteen minutes, they will have attack confirmation. Commanders will be pressing for release authority to retaliate. This is precisely the point when our first SLBMs begin to destroy their early warning and surveillance apparatus, sowing confusion through their ranks. All the command centers will be manned at peacetime levels; government officials will be spread throughout Washington. We have simulated this timeline many times in war games, and we were not physically able to link the proper players before twenty minutes, at the earliest. By then most SLBMs will have detonated on their targets, annihilating the American command and control, and our ICBMs will be bearing down on the northernmost missile bases.”
    “You actually acted this out?”
    “Yes, Defense Minister. We spread players across the western Russia, linked with simulated WWMCCS command and control circuits. They even followed fabricated schedules, moving from place to place. The best they could accomplish was a hasty conference call in twenty minutes, and that was with all the players well coached. In many ways, the Americans’ technological superiority hinders them. Their sensors provide a surfeit of data. What specific bases or facilities are targeted? When will the weapons arrive? The decision makers drown in detail.”
    “But,” interrupted the defense minister, “the Americans have contingency plans. Just as we do.”
    “No question. But remember, the American bombers and tankers are no longer on alert. They will be caught on the ground. Even their ICBMs are taken off alert more frequently for maintenance. And no employment of weapons may take place until proper release authority is received from their president.”
    “You’re sure of that?”
    “Positive. Only in an increased state of readiness could that authority be predelegated to their theater and specified commanders in chiefs. And only then after extensive consultation.”
    “I suppose. Continue.”
    Ryzhkov hunched forward, his eyes riveted on the defense minister. “The American president faces a dilemma. At best, he has ten minutes before the first reentry vehicles arrive at the silo fields in North Dakota. Probably less. Five minutes more for the southernmost fields. Taking into account the necessity to avoid flying their ICBMs through detonating weapons, our simulations predicted an average decision time of six minutes. Six minutes to decide whether to retaliate. Even if the president immediately acceded to his military advisors, he would have to step through authentication to generate and release the appropriate messages to their nuclear forces. We estimate that process at two to three minutes at best, assuming no delays. Then the launch control crews in the silo fields must decode the message, complete checklists, and then launch. Under training conditions, this can be done in two minutes. With the pressure of a surprise attack, the time could easily double. So, you can see, if everything went perfectly, the Americans would launch their ICBM’s just as our nuclear warheads detonated overhead, blasting them from the sky. In reality, they would never get close. We are convinced the decision to retaliate would require from fifteen to thirty minutes. By then our strike would be history.”
    The defense minister