Free Red Hammer 1994 by Robert Ratcliffe

staff.
    “I’m as surprised as you, Defense Minister,” Kiselev replied, holding up his hands in surrender.
    “I should explain,” interjected Ryzhkov quickly. “This is not a war plan, but the result of extensive war gaming in our Plans Department. Colonel General Strelkov has been the action officer on the project. He can describe it much better than I.”
    Strelkov leaned forward and positioned the document squarely in front of the defense minister then opened it to the first page. “If you will allow me, Defense Minister, I shall give an overview of the project.” A look of resignation captured the defense minister.
    “Another technical brief,” he muttered under his breath. “God help me. Proceed.” It was a less than enthusiastic embrace.
    “During the first START negotiations many years ago, the Strategic Rocket Forces’ Plans Department supported our team with computer analyses of different negotiating positions, both ours and the Americans. This permitted us to refine our computer models and build a database of hundreds of computer-simulation runs. Rather quickly, an obvious trend developed. With pre-START forces, the outcome of a nuclear exchange was generally independent of who launched first, or the degree of strategic warning or mobilization underta-ken by either side. Neither side could achieve decisive results.”
    “You’re losing me, General, get to the point,” interrupted the defense minister. The military always talked in circles.
    “In other words, before the build down, each side had such an abundance of weapons that little advantage was gained by launching a preemptive strike. A massive retaliation with surviving weapons would severely cripple the attacker. And, each side would still have sufficient weapons held in reserve for negotiation, or for threatening third parties.
    “But, the force levels coming out of START I and II created a more dynamic environment. A drastic cut in the number of weapons, the shift in total force structure, and the quality of replacement systems for each leg of the triad combined to create anomalies.”
    Ryzhkov frowned, sensing the defense minister’s frustration. “What the General is saying is that with little or no warning, a decisive engagement is possible. I was surprised myself, Defense Minister.”
    “So,” replied the defense minister, unconvinced, rubbing his chin, “you’re stating that deterrence has actually been reduced?”
    “Under certain circumstances, Defense Minister. Limited warning, even hours, negates this advantage. But absolutely no warning produces dramatic results. A window of opportunity, if you will.”
    The defense minister sat attentively, painstakingly weighing the powerful conclusion. “Do you agree with this?” he asked Kiselev.
    “Possibly, Defense Minister.”
    “Possibly?” He was an inch from exploding. This so-called plan reeked of bullshit.
    “Our war plans assume hostilities would begin with conventional forces and potentially escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. We have no plans calling for a strictly nuclear attack. To date, discussions of this nature have been nothing more than an academic exercise, useful only for understanding the interrelationships between different weapons systems.”
    The defense minister loosened his tie then reached for another cigarette. Lighting it quickly, he tossed his lighter on the table. “Fine,” he said testily, easing the pressure, “tell me more.”
    “Soon after the START I signing, we began serious war gaming. Within two years we had developed three proven scenarios. Satisfied, we pressed our planners to see if the attack strategies we had developed could actually be formulated into an operations plan. We were well aware of the tendency for war gamers to develop unrealistic scenarios which play well on the computer but fail miserably under the harsh light of day. It was an iterative process, forcing us to modify certain assumptions, but the basic framework