Free Theodore Roosevelt by Louis Auchincloss Page A

first his fist and then his finger. And now we find him writing Jacob Schiff about the persecution of Jews in Russia:
    Why, my dear Mr. Schiff, the case was much simpler as regards the Armenians a few years ago. There the Turkish government was responsible and was able to enforce whatever was desired. The outrages on the Armenians were exactly the same as those perpetrated on the Jews of Russia, both in character and in extent. But we did not go to war with Turkey. Inasmuch as it was certain that our people would not go into such a war … it would have been worse than foolish to have threatened it, and not the slightest good would have been or was gained by any agitation which it was known would not be backed up by arms.

Nine
    Since the beginning of 1904 Russia and Japan had been engaged in a savage war for supremacy in Northeast Asia. To the astonishment and awakening of the world Japan had emerged as a first-class military and naval power, sinking or capturing the bulk of the Russian fleet, taking Port Arthur, and driving deep into Manchuria. TR had at first favored Japan—Russia had antagonized America and much of Europe by her aggressiveness and arrogance in the Far East—but he now cast a wary eye on Tokyo as a potential opponent of American interests in the Pacific. It would be as well for everyone if Japan did not gain too sweeping a victory, and he decided to use such international influence as he had to procure a settlement.
    The Japanese were certainly winning the war, but it was costing them dearly. Russia could always fall back on a seemingly infinite source of manpower if it chose and, as it appeared stubbornly willing to, drag on the conflict. Both sides, therefore, should have been open to overtures, and Roosevelt decided to approach the czar directly through his ambassador in St. Petersburg rather than deal with the prickly and proud Russian legate in Washington. After much jockeying for position both belligerents agreed to a peace conference in the United States, and TR was able to persuade them to pick Portsmouth, New Hampshire, over Washington, as the summer heat in the capital would hardly have been conducive to coolness of temper.
    At this time John Hay, whom TR had inherited as secretary of state from McKinley, died and was replaced by Elihu Root, who had been TR’s secretary of war before retiring to resume his highly successful law practice in New York. Hay had been a close friend of Roosevelt’s as well as of his father, but the president had found him lacking in vigor and drive and was glad to have the services in state of Root, a brilliant and caustic attorney who, as Edith Roosevelt put it, was well qualified to give her husband advice because their characters were so different. Root knew how to keep TR’s expansive imagination within reasonable bounds; he used his biting, sardonic humor with good effect on a chief who took it surprisingly well. But that is something always to keep in mind in any evaluation of Roosevelt: his reason was constantly at work, however unperceived, to balance the wildness of his words. At least until the last few years of his life.
    The most difficult issue in the negotiations at Portsmouth was Japan’s demand for an indemnity. Japan’s emissaries finally agreed to drop the term indemnity as humiliating to Russia and instead call the sum demanded the price for half of Sakhalin Island, which Russia was to cede to Japan. The Russians, however, continued stubbornly to resist the imposition of any payment, and TR had to use all his powers of persuasion to convince the Japanese to be content with what they already had: control of Korea and Manchuria and a fleet doubled at the expense of the Russian navy. He also used the clinching argument that a continuation of the war would cost even a victor far more than any indemnity that could be extracted from a defeated enemy. What good would Siberia do for Japan even if she conquered it all?
    Japan